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PREFACE 
The purpose of this.dissertation is to develop and empirically 
test an economic model of local ec;lucation spendingo The analysis of 
governmental spending has been a relatively neglected area of economic 
inquiryo Fiscal theorists have, traditionally, concentrated almost 
entirely upon examining the tax side of the tax-expenditure processo 
Giyen the current importance of govermnent activity in the economic. 
system this seems unfortunateo It is hoped that the present study rep-
resents a small step toward presenting a methodology which is useful in 
analyzing, by using the traditional tools of economic analysis, a por-
tion of government activity. 
This investigation could not have been completed without the 
assistance of many personso I would like to take this opportunity to 
express my appreciation for the guidance given _by my advisory committee .. 
Special gratitude is due Dro Robert Lo Sandmeyer for his direction, 
assistance, and generous.contribut.ion of time, Drs, Gerald Mo Lage, 
Rudolph Wo Trenton, and Larkin Bo Warner also provided helpful sugges-
tions which contributed.to the dissertationo 
Data inputs for the study were readily provided by the following: 
The Honorable Oo Frank Thornton, Secretary of State, State of South 
Carolina; Mr. David So Matthews, Supervisor of Internal Operations, 
State Department of Education, State of South Carolina; the Virginia 
State Board of Education; and the Virginia State Board of Electionso 
It is doubtful that the dissertat:i,.on could have.been completed without 
iii 
the splendid assistance given my by these individuals and o:rganizationso 
Mr O Robert Klein performed data handling a.nd processing tasks in 
his usual meticulous fashion •. His assistance on this and other projects 
over the past three years has been invaluableo Mro Jimmie O'Steen, 
Director of the Southeastern State College Computer Center, provided 
valuable assistance, I am indebted to Miss Anne Berryhill and Mrs, 
Velma Dittmar, who typed early drafts of the dissertation and to Miss 
Eloise Dreessen, who typed the final copy, A special appreciation i.s 
due Miss Berryhill for her patience and maintenance of good humor while 
struggling through the many early versions.of the work" I also wish 
to thank Mrso Mary Frye of Southeastern State College for reading the 
final draft and making suggestions which improved the clarity of the 
dissertationo 
A special indebtedness is acknowledged to Dro Lee Bo Zinkj former 
Director of the Technology Use Studies Centero Dro Zink has served as 
employer, counselor, and friend throughout our several years of close 
associatiOI).o His early interest and support are deeply appreciatedo 
Finally, I should like to express unique.appreciation to my wife 
Jo and my family for their patience, understanding, an~l encouragement 
throughout a most t:rying periodo Without these~ the dissertation could 
have never been completedo 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
It is widely recognized that government activity constitutes an 
important facet of the economic landscape. The quantitative signifi-
cance of contemporary government is illustrated by the fact that in 
1968 government purchases of.goods and services amounted to over $197 
1 billion or 23 percent of the United States gross national product. 
Economic theorists have carefully analyzed the impact of governmental 
spending upon the economic system, However, in aggregate models of 
economic activity the.level of government spending is an exogenous var-
iable--predetermined by the political process. 
What is the so-called "political process"? In a democratic soci-
ety, such a process must imply actions derived in some manner from in-
dividu~l choice. Individuals must, in a democracy, ultimately allocate 
resources for public as well as for private satisfaction of wants. But 
there is no accepted theory explaining the governmental expenditure 
variable that corresponds to the usual neoclassical market theory of 
consumer choice. Fiscal theorists have concentrated their attention 
almost exclusively upon the tax side of the tax-expenditure process. 
Economists have allocated few resources to providing an explanation of 
how individual choices produce collective fiscal outcomes. As 
1Derived from U. S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business, Vol. 49 (February 1969), p. 9. 
1 
Buchanan notes: 
Little is known about individual actions and attitudes in 
collective, and specifically fiscal, choice. Scholars have 
simply not been interested in the behavior of individuals 
as political decision-makers. Once a democratic model for 
the political order is accepted, however, the gaps in our 
knowledge become apparent, and the need for many man-years 
of research is evident. Once we acknowledge that individ-
uals as voters, or potential voters, in a broadly democratic 
political order ultimately determine the size of the public 
economy along with its composition, we are obligated to try 
to find out as much as we can about their choices. 
Very little research has been done; what has been done is 
widely scattered; much of this remains in1omplete, and the 
questions asked have been the wrong ones, 
2 
Collective. decision models, with individual choice as the basic assump-
tion underlying the analysis, may be developed using the traditional 
tools of economic analysis, In this view, "government" activity repre-
sents the collective decisions. of individuals who are assumed to maxi-
mize utility, 
Nature of the Present Study 
The premise underlying the present study is that individuals make 
fiscal choices. An individualistic approach is assumed wherein individ-
uals view collective choice decisions within the usual utility maxi-
mization framework. Thus, individuals are presumed to make fiscal 
choices which maximize utility in terms of their own utility functions. 
This should not be interpreted to imply .that individuals are hedonistic 
in evaluating fiscal programs, Utility functions are assumed to contain 
altruistic motivations as well as purely personal considerations. 
In support of the contention that individuals make fiscal choices 
2 James M. Buchanan, Public Finance in Democratic Process (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967), p. !SL 
3 
as utility maximizers, a model of local public education spending is 
developed and empirically tested. The approach is to identify those 
factors which should influence individual demand for local public edu-
cation. Since these factors primarily involve individual preferences 
for public education, which represent the "givens" of economic analysis, 
economic theory does not provide a guide for their selection. 
A general framework for analyzing local government spending must 
then be developed. Many studies in recent years have been concerned 
with the determinants of government expenditures. In each of these 
studies the primary objective has been to identify variables which sta-
tistically explain variation in the level of expenditures among juris-
dictions and to measure the relative importance of the selected vari-
ables. !he usual model employs some form of cross-section regression 
analysis. A weakness common.to most of these studies is the absence. 
of a model or general framework for analysis. It is part of the objec-
tive of this study t;o provide an analytical framework for the local 
sector of the public economy. Once the theoretical model has been de-
veloped, a form of cross-section regression analysis will be used to 
test it. An analysis will be made for the year 1962, the latest year 
for which .census data are available. The study will focus on county 
areas in Virginia and South Carolina for an empirical test of the model. 
It should perhaps be emphasized that this study is concerned with 
an economic theory of local government spending. In constructing this 
theory, abstraGtion from the purely political aspects of the problem is. 
made. An alternative to the economic interpretation is construction of 
a political behavior model. Adoption of the economic theory construct 
does not imply that observed political influences are unimportant in 
the expenditure process" However, political decision making is a com-
plex process and once a democratic ·order is postulated, 
"""' analysis that cuts through the maze and examines the 
cost and benefit calculus of the individual as if he makes 
specific choices seems necessary as a starting point"3 
4 
The individualistic economic model use.cl here represents one approach to 
explaining fiscal outcomes" The alternative and equally applicable 
political approach is reserved for those with both th.e inclination and 
ability to pursue this path. 
Plan of Study 
In Chapter .II the individualistic approach to explaining fiscal 
outcomes is .examined. The theoretical model of local education ex-
penditures, which is based upon results derived in Chapter II, is 
developed in Chapter III. Ch~pter III also contains a brief examina-
tion of recent studies which relate to the present; investigation. 
Chapter IV is devoted to an empirical evaluation of the theoretical. 
construct.ion presented in Chapter II!" The conclusi,ons .and implica-
tions to be drawn from the inquiry are presented in Chapter V. 
CHAPTER II 
THE INDIVIDUALISTIC FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
OF COLLECTIVE FISCAL CHOICE 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the framework for anal-
ysis of fiscal choice to be used in this study. Results derived in 
this chapter provide the basis for building a model of local public 
education spending which follows in Chapter III. In constructing the 
local public education spending model, a basic premise is that an in-
dividualistic approach is appropriate. Two separate views of govern-
ment--the organic and individualistic concepts--are briefly discussed. 
Since this study is concerned with education, a quasi-public good, 
the distinction between a pure-·public good and a quasi-public good is 
drawn. The discussion is in terms of the different manner in which 
each enters into the individual's utility function. 
In order for the individualistic approach to be relevant it must 
be shown that true preference.s for public goods will be revealed. It 
has been emphasized in the public finance literature that individuals 
will not reveal true preferences for public goods under a voluntary 
arrangement. A political mechanism, rather than a market mechanism, 
must therefore be employed to allocate resources to public use. The 
contention that true preferences will not be revealed is examined in 
light of institutions which would tend to eliminate the motive for such 
individual behavior, A simple collective decision model is used to 
5 
6 
illustrate that the motive for strategic behavior is not present in 
the framework adopted hereo 
The Concept of Government 
In developing a framework within which fiscal outcomes are anal-· 
yzed, the concept of "government" must be briefly explored" The view 
of government used dictates the questions asked regarding fiscal insti-
tutions and collective outcomes. A difference in analysis can result~ 
for example, when the frame of reference is the individual participat-
ing in collective choice situations as opposed to a reference system 
revolving around a budgetary authority presumed to make fiscal deci·-
sions. Therefore, it is necessary as a point of departure to define 
clearly the concept of government and the resulting reference system 
underlying the analysis in this studyo It is particularly necessary 
here because the framework adopted is different from that found in most 
currently-accepted views on fiscal theory" 
It has been suggested that there are essentially two separate and 
opposing conceptions of government upon which a theory of public finance 
1 
may rest, In the first, government is considered a unitary being, 
This organic concept of the state depicts government as a single deci-
sion-making unit for society. Viewed in this manner, the decision 
processes are supposed to be similar to those of a private individual 
making market choiceso Individuals, in making private market choices, 
are assumed to behave as if they attempt to maximize their utility 
1James M. Buchanan, "The Pure Theory of Government Finance: a 
Suggested Approach," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LVII (December 
1949), ppo 496-5050 
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subject to budgetary constraints. Thus, the fiscal authority is, in 
the organic view of government, thought of as a "person" seeking to 
maximize the "public interesLII For consistent decisions to be made, 
"government" must possess some integrated preference system which is 
based upon some criteria, This becomes the heart of the problem when 
it is assumed that government operates with the objective of fostering 
the public interest. There is no ultimately correct or agreed-upon 
criterion as to exactly what constitutes the public interesto Any con-
cept of the public interest must of necessity be quite arbitrary. The 
public interest is, in the final analysis, what each individual views 
it to beo 
Many persons have in their minds quite misleading images of 
government in action. To some, government suggests only 
smoke-filled rooms, corruption, inefficiency and impending 
oppression. To others, government apparently means an im-
personal device that will automatically act in the public 
interest. Moreover, since there is no agreed-upon conception 
of the public interest, each of these persons means his idea 
of the public interest. Thus many persons, especially when 
they say "The government should control this or that," 
apparently visualize government as an impersonal force that 
will automatically implement their policy ideas. 2 
The other view of government, accepted as the framework for analy-
sis in this study, is purely an individualistic one. The focus of 
analysis is upon the individual as he participates in making collective 
choice fiscal decisions. In this view, government activity represents 
the collective decisions of individuals composing societyo 3 In a 
2 Roland No McKean, Public ~pending (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1968), p, llo 
3The proposition that the valuation of public goods originates with 
individual members of society is not new. An individualistic approach 
to examining governmental activity is an integral part of the works of 
Maffeo Pantaleoni, Emil Sax, Knut Wicksell, Erik Lindahl, and others. 
See Richard Ao Musgrave and Alan To Peacock, eds,, Classics in the 
Theory Ei. Public Finance (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964)"~-
8 
broadly democratic setting this concept of government appears to be the 
appropriate one since the essential philosophical entity is the individ-
ual, rather than society" 
In the economic analysis of market exchange, the underlying indi-
vidual motivation is utility maximization. This same basic value 
motive is assumed to be predominant in the generation of collective out-
comes via individual choiceo Individual utility functions differ among 
individuals making up the collective body. Rationality is assumed·as a 
behavior characteristic of individuals as they pursue collective fiscal 
outcomeso Thus, the representative individual can rank alternative 
combinations of goods and services in a consistent manner, This applies 
to public as well as private goods and services" 
In order to predict .behavior within the utility maximization model, 
some further propositions are required, The .items making up individ-
ual utility functions are to some extent substitutes for each othero 
In the theory of consumer choice, a basic proposition is that the lower 
the price of a.good or service the greater is the quantity demanded, 
The consumer sets out to maximize his utility subject to constraints 
imposed upon him" These constraints are the consumer's income and the 
prices of goods and services which enter his utility function. Basic 
to utility analysis is the proposition that some amount of a particular 
good will compensate the individual for giving up a unit of some other 
good, As the price of one good decreases, other goods become relatively 
more expensive; and more of the first good is demanded. The assumption 
here is that individuals derive benefits from public as well as private 
goodso The basic propositions regarding utility maximization and con-
sumer demand are applicable to an examination of public goods, 
Individuals, when confronted with making collective fiscal deci.-
sions, evaluate the marginal costs and benefits derived from specific 
public goods in terms of their own utility functionso It is further 
assumed here that fiscal outcomes are made directly by individual 
citizens through the voting processo Thus, the contention is that a 
model of direct democracy may be useful in describing observed govern-
mental-expenditure levelso Under a decision rule of simple majority, 
h d ' f b f h ' ' d , , 4 t e me ian pre erence mem er o t e community is ec1s1ve, The col-
lective results will thus be in the direction most preferred by the 
individual whose preferences represent the community median, 
It should perhaps be emphasized that the utility maximization 
hypothesis does not imply that individuals are solely motivated by 
selfish interestso Surely, individuals are motivated by altruistic as 
well as selfish considerationso The individual's utility function is 
derived from a complex of motivations which probably covers the whole 
spectrum between the two extremes of purely selfish to purely altru-
istico In this respect, McKean notes that 
Each individual adjusts or makes decisions so as to maximize 
his utility as he sees it. In other words his behavior is 
generally purposeful, not randomo5 (footnote omitted) He 
takes those actions that he believes to be best, This does 
not imply that he is highly hedonistic, selfish, callous, 
materialistic, immoral, or anything of the sort, The thou-
sands of items that contribute to an individual's "utility" 
in this sense include helping others, performing tasks well, 
playing and relaxing, exploring ideas, enjoying beautiful 
scenery and works of art, enjoying peace of mind, and ad-
hering to moral codes and ethical rules--as well as having 
personal comfort, material goods, prestige and so on, 
Selfishness means attaching a higher value to helping oneself 
than helping others,6 (footnote omitted) Utility maximization 
9 
4Assuming single-peaked preference schedules in order that simple'"" 
majority voting yields some determinate outcomeo 
simply means choosing purposefully in view of whatever 
utility a person ascribes to the things he .. wants (or 
doesn't want) and deems attainableo5 
10 
The utility maximization assumption permits the building of an economic 
model of government spending which is in some sense analogous to private 
market choice. No attempt is made here to develop such a comprehensive 
theory of governmental spending and taxing. Rather, the purpose is to 
derive a simple economic.model of local educational expenditures within 
a given tax-institution framework~ A given tax institution means that 
the method of allocating tax shares among individuals has been pre-
determined by an existing constitution.. Thus, a governmental cons ti tu-
tion might specify that a particular public good is to be financed from 
income tax revenueo Another level of analysis, which is not investi~ 
gated here, has the objective of examining individual choice among tax 
i ' . 6 nstitutions. In this study, the predetermined tax institution rep-
resents a "given" to the indivdual as he participates in determining 
the use and allocation of public resources. 
Pure-Public and Quasi-Public Goods 
A pure~public good is usually defined as being available to be con-
7 
sumed in equal amounts by alL The essential characteristic of a pure-
public good is.that benefits among individuals are indivisible. The 
5 McKean;, p. 130 
6This problem is examined in Part II of Buchanan, Public Finance 
in Democratic Processo 
7 Paul A. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. XXXVI (November 1954), ppo 
387-389and "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure," 
Review of Economics and Statistics, VoL XXXVII (November 1955), pp, 
350-356. 
11 
equal~consumption definition presumably stems directly from the indi-
visibility property along with the recognition that to exclude individ-
uals from enjoying benefits would be costly, 
The orthodox equal=consumption definition is unduly restrictive 
dh b 1 """ dB an as een severe y criticize. The equal-consumption definition 
need not be implied in the .case of a pure-public good. Thus, a pure-· 
public good satisfies more than one demand and is produced for joint 
consumption by individuals. 9 The unit of a public good involved is a 
production unit which is made available for joint consumption, In terms 
of usual quantity and quality .standards, individual consumption units 
b 'd 1 d" lO may e w1 e. y ivergent, 
In the case of a pure-public good, one individual's consumption in 
no way affects the benefits derived by another individual. Assuming 
one private good Z, one pure-public good X, and two individuals, this 
condition may be expressed in terms of utility functions as 
(1) ui 
(2) uJ = uj czj ,xi + x.J) 
where 
zi 
= quantity of private good z purchased by individual i 
zJ = quantity of private good z purchased by individual j 
8see Julius Margolis, "A Comment on .the Pure Theory of Public 
Expenditure," Review of Economics and _£ta~, VoL XXXVII (November 
1955), ppo 347-349. -
9on the development of public goods in terms of joint supply, see 
James M, Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods (Chicago: Rand 
McNally and Company, 1968)0 A public good in Buchanan's ancJ.lysis refers 
to any good that individuals have collectively deci.ded to have provided 
by government, Th::ls definition of a public good is used in this study" 
The question of what goods should be provided by government is not an 
issue here, 
10 0 Ibid,, p. 54. 
12 
xi 
= quantity of pure-p1.1,blic good x "purchased" by individual i 
xj 
= quantity of pure-public good x "purchased" by individual j 
Individual i derives benefits from individual j's consumption of X and 
vice-versa. In this case·of a pure-public good~ externalities are 
0 1 11 reciproca o Thus, the benefits derived by individual i from indi-
vidual j's consumption of X are of the same nature as those derived by 
j from i's consUI\lption of x. 12 · The same unit of production is avail--
able for joint consumption by both individual i and individual Jo 
It may be argued that the polar case of a pure·-public good has 
little relevance because in fact there are few, if any, such goods in 
existenceo Most public goods have both specific (private) and public 
benefits associated with themo Public goods that yield some degree of 
divisibility among individuals are usually termed quasi-public goodso 
Public education provides an example. Governmentally provided educa-
tion is not a pure-public good because benefits are divisible. Bene-
fits are· directly associated .with .those individuals being educated. 
It is also widely recognized that at the same time, as a result of the 
educational process, benefits do accrue to other individuals in the 
communityo Thus, although benefits are primarily differential and 
private, reciprqcal externalitiel:! in consumption are also generatedo 
These latter benefits which flow from a literate community are equally 
available for all individuals to consumeo In terms of utility 
11 
· Only externaliti~s in consumption are considered here. More 
frequently, externalities are identified with production rather than 
with consumptiono 
12Richard Ao Musgrave, "Provision for Social Goods'' (unpub, paper 
read for the International Economic Association i.n Biarritz, September 
1966), p. lOo 
13 
functions, again assuming.one private good, one public good 1 and two 
individuals (family units), this situation may be represented as 
where 
zi 
= quantity of private good z purchased by individual i 
zj 
= quantity of private good z purchased by individual j 
xi 
- quantity of public good x "purchased" by individual i for 
private consumption 
xj 
= quantity of public good x "purchased" by individual j for 
private consumption 
' . x 1 
= quantity of public good x "purchased II by individual i for 
public consumption 
I • 
X J = quantity of public good X "purchased" by individual j for 
public consumption 
In this case, the public good (education) generates two distinct types 
of benefits; one is purely private and applies to own-consumption only, 
while the other is purely public and is equally available for joint 
13 
consumption •. 
Family .units with an own-consumption component (families with 
children) derive differentially higher benefits than family units with-
out an own-consumption component. At the same·time family units or 
13Ibid., p. 14. Musgrave notes that recognition of the fact that 
governmentally-provided goods.involve varying degrees of publicness 
hardly renders analysis in terms of the polar case useless (p. 10). He 
then demonstrates that a quasi-public good can readily be incorporated 
into the conventional-type analysis. That is, for purposes of analysis, 
public goods may be conceptualized in terms of the polar case of a pure-
public good. 
14 
individuals without own-consumption components receive spillover bene-
fits from direct beneficiaries. Thus, in the evaluation of benefits 
derived from public education, family units consider both own-
consumption and consumption by other families in the community. In 
effect, each family or individual act of consuming education is thought 
14 
of as being a separate public good. 
Public Goods and Revealed Preferences 
In the private sector of the economy a price system operates to 
allocate resources among competing uses in accordance with consumer 
preferences. In the case of public goods, no such market mechanism 
exists to serve as a guide for resource allocation to the public sector, 
Various attempts have, however, been made to analyze government expendi-
tures within a framework analogous to the private market concept. The 
benefit theory of taxation has developed along these lines. 15 According 
to the benefit approach, the demand for public goods depends upon pref-
erence patterns of individuals within society. In the individualistic 
framewor~, social wants are generated in the same manner as private 
wants. Individuals are assumed to derive benefits from publicly-pro-
vided goods and services and are capable of evaluating these benefits. 
Taxes are viewed as voluntary payments made by individuals in exchange 
14This procedure permits public goods (pure and impure) as well as 
private goods to be analyzed as public goods in the orthodox manner. 
For development of this, see Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public 
Goods. 
15No attempt is made here to trace the development of this ap-
proach. For a review of specific contributions see Donald Ray Escarraz, 
"A Study of the Voluntary Exchange or Price Theory of Public Finance" 
(unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Oklahoma State University, 1964), Chapters 
II and III. 
15 
for public goods provided on the basis of individual preferences. 
A central problem in attempting to develop a positive theory of 
government within the individualistic framework has been the indivisi-
bility of benefits from public goods and services among individuals. 
The individual knows that his contribution to providing public goods 
represents a small amount in relation to total costs involved. Under a 
voluntary situation, the individual might then view his benefit as in-
dependent of his personal contribution. Thus, the inducement is to 
conceal true preferences, since the individual cannot be excluded from 
16 the benefits of public goods. 
16That individuals will not reveal true preferences for public 
goods has led to two observations in the literature. First, there 
exists multiple Pareto-optimum solutions to the problem of allocating 
resources to the satisfaction of public wants. Second, since the 
market mechanism fails, a political process which forces individuals to 
reveal true preferences must be substituted for the market process. 
Thefirst implication has been emphasized by Paul A. Samuelson in "The 
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. XXXVI (November 1954), pp, 387-389 and-..Diagrammatic Exposition 
of a Theory of Public Expenditure," Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. XXXVII (November 1955) , pp. 350-356. ~he second implication has 
been emphasized by R. A. Musgrave, The Theory£!_ Public Finance (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959), Chapters 4 and 60 For a 
critique and suggested modification of the Musgrave-Samuelson exposi-
tions, see Donald R. Escarraz, The Price Theory£!_ Value in Public 
Finance (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1966). 
For a critical examination of the contentions that consumers 
will not reveal true preferences and a single Pareto optimum will not 
be reached, see Ansel M. Sharp and Donald R. Escarraz, ''A Reconsider-
ation of the Price or Exchange Theory of Public Finance," Southern 
Economic Journal, Vol. XXXI (October 1964), pp. 132-139. 
Km.it Wicks ell recognized the non-revelation of true preferences 
by individuals as a problem and concentrated upon the political aspects 
of public resource allocation. See "A New Principle of Just Taxation," 
in Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock, eds., Classics in the 
Theory of P1,1blic Finance (New York: Sto Martin's Press, 1964), pp, 
72-118. Buchanan has emphasized Wicksell's contribution in Public 
Finance in Democratic Process and The Demand and Supply of Public 
Goods. 
16 
Buchanan argues that within a given institutional setting the 
existence of indivisibility of public-goods supply need not cause the 
17 individual to .conceal his true preferences. Most real-world political 
st.ructures eliminate any incentive that the individual might .have to 
conceal his.true preferences for public goods because 
A "tax structure" or "tax system" is chosen quite independ-
ently of the particular allocation of benefits in specific 
instances, and expenditures are.voted in the knowledge that 
taxes will, in fact, be distributed among individuals in 
accordance with the tax institutions in being.18 
The individual motivation for strategic behavior along the lines which 
Musgrave has stressed depends upon the.assumption that such behavior 
will modify the individual's tax-price. This possibility .does not exist 
for the individual when fiscal choice is examined in a setting where 
the .tax institution is predetermined. The distribution of tax-prices 
among individuals is exogenously determined by the tax institution at 
this. level of fiscal choice. Since tax institutions. are selected con-
stitutionally, individual evaluations of public goods do not directly 
affect the per unit tax-price. 19 
These distinctions may be illustrated graphically. First, consider 
the voluntary-exchange model presented in Figure 1. Assume a three·-
person community in which the only difference among individuals is their 
20 demand for public good X. The demand curves dA' dB' and de depict 
17 Buchanan, Public Finance in.Democratic Process, Chpater 9. 
18Ibid., p. 119. 
19 Ibid. 
2
°For simplicity assume that the public good represents a pure-
public good. The analysis is not affected if the public good is quasi-
public. For an explanation of how a quasi-public good can be analyzed 
in terms of the pure-public good case see Musgrave, "Provision for 
Social Goods." 
Tax-Price per Unit 
Tc 
Tg 
s 
TA -------··-----
17 
Q X per U.T. 
Figure 1. A Voluntary-Exchange Model 
18 
the respective individual demands for public good X. A vertical summa-
tion of individual demands, DA+B+Ct' represents the aggregate demand 
21 for the public good. A vertical summation is indicated because the 
same unit of production is available for joint consumption" The supply 
curve, SS, assumes that public good Xis produced under constant-cost 
conditions. Aggregate output, x1 , is determined by the intersection of 
SS ancl D A+B+ct• Unit prices for the three individuals are than TA, TB, 
and TC. Thus, the tax-price .each individual faces depends directly 
upon his evaluation of the public good" Discrimination in tax-prices 
among individuals is then a result of different individual evaluations 
of the public good. 
Now consider the situation where the amount of a public good pro-
vided is the result of a voting process. It is. assumed here that 
direct democracy prevails wherein all citizens participate in the col-
lective .decision. Recall that the tax institution which allocates the 
tax bill among individuals is predetermined by the constitution. Table 
I may be used to illustrate the relationship between the assumed tax 
institution and tax-prices" Suppose that the community is composed of 
three individuals who each own taxable property assessed at $10,000" 
It is further assumed that the public good is produced at a constant 
marginal cost of $100 per unit" The predetermined constitution speci-
fies that provision of the public good is to be financed through the 
levy of a tax on property within .the jurisdiction" The total assessed 
property in the three-person community is $30,000, which represents the 
21The vertical summation of individual demand curves to determine 
aggregate demand in the case of a public good is associated with Howard 
R. Bowen, Toward Social Economy (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 
1948), pp. 177-1800 . 
Units 
Public 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Note: 
of 
TABLE I 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC GOOD SUPPLY AND TAX-PRICE 
WHEN THE TAX INSTITUTION IS PREDETERMINED 
Assessed Tax-Price 
Total Cost Property Value per Unit 
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Good of Public Good of Individual of Public Good 
$100 $10,000 $33,33 
200 10,000 33,33 
300 10,000 33,33 
400 10,000 33,33 
500 10,000 33,33 
600 10,000 33.33 
700 10,000 33.33 
800 10,000 33.33 
900 10,000 33.33 
1,000 10,000 33,33 
The example assumes three individuals each with assessed 
property of $10,000. 
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sum of the individual $10,000 assessments, Suppose that, through a 
' ,f' f 
political process, the individuals decide to supply one unit of the, 
public good, Thus, $100 is the sum that must be collected from the 
property tax for this purpose, The tax rate applied to assessed prop-· 
erty is $100/$30,000 or 0.3333 percent. The tax-price per unit of the 
?ublic good then becomes $33.33 (0.003333 X $10,000). Under the 
assumption of constant marginal costs in the supply of the public good, 
the tax-price confronted by the individual remains invariant over 
quantity. 
Assume that the good under consideration is local public educa-
tion.22 Benefits as viewed by the family unit in terms of its own 
utility function include both specific (private) and indirect (public) 
benefits, Costs to the individual or family are estimated on the basis 
23 
of how the given tax institution allocates tax shares. The given tax 
institution specifies the manner in which tax shares are·allocated to 
specific individuals. Suppose that the prior-determined constitµtion 
specifies that a property tax is to be used to publicly provide educa-
tional services. Then in terms of the individual decision calculus, 
the individual makes a cost-benefit evaluation of the public good in 
order to determine his preferred quantity. The individual will prefer 
22rndivisibility of benefits is not the central issue in this 
case. In the example that follows, the same principles apply to any 
public good. Si~ce education is publicly provided the individual may 
still view the situation as similar to that of a pure-public good. 
That is, the motivation .for concealing true preferences may still be 
present in the belief .that full exclusion is not possible. Thus the 
individual may still think that 'he can derive the benefits from con-
sumption of the public good without contributing his portion of the 
costs, 
23Throughout the remainder of the discussion of this example, the 
term individual is used to refer to either individuals or individual 
family units. 
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that quantity where an incremental unit of output equates marginal costs 
and benefiJ:s o 
.tr 
Individual demand curves for the public good can be derived in the 
usual mannero It is assumed that, for each individual, the per unit 
tax-price remains invariant over quantityo Thus as quantities change 
the marginal tax per unit of output remains equal to the average tax 
per unit. This assumption permits an individual demand curve for the 
public good to be derived in the orthodox fashionc 24 To derive an in-
dividual demand curve for the public good, the individual is concept-
ually confronted with a series of alternative tax-prices and indicates 
the respective quantities demandedo 
Again assume a three-person community in which the only difference 
among individuals is in their demand for public good Xo 25 In all other 
respects, including those relevant for determining tax liabilities as 
specified in the predetermined tax-sharing arrangement, the three in-
dividuals are assumed to be identical, Determination of the quantity 
of public good X produced via a political process is illustrated in. 
Figure 2. Based upon the predetermined tax-sharing arrangement, each 
individual estimates that provision of public good X results in a per 
unit tax-price of t 1 • Preferred individual quantities are then x1 , x2 , 
an_d x3 o Assume that the decision rule for the combining individual 
votes to arrive at collective decisions is that of simple majority-
votingo Individuals are assumed to have single-peaked preference 
schedules in order that a determinate outcome is produced under 
24Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, p. 440 
25The following discussion is based upon Buchanan, Public Finance 
in Democratic Process, Chapter 11. 
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Tax-Price per Unit 
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Figure 2o Collective Results Under Simple Majority Voting 
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h d . . l 26 t e ecision rue. 
Under simple majority-voting, the median-preference quantity is 
dominant. Thus.individual Bis decisive in the majority decision. In-
dividual A will prefer output x2 to any larger quantity whereas indi-
vidual C will prefer the quantity x2 .to any smaller quantity. Theim-
plication of the median-man construction for the analysis is that 
fiscal collec.tive outcomes can be predicted to be in the direction of 
those expected on·the basis·of median group preferences. Thus, x2 is 
the quantity of educational services that will be produced and made 
available for each res.ident. The same physical output. is then avail-
ablefor individuals to.consume for both private and collective con-
1;iumption use. · 
Figure 2 thus indicates that the individual's. tax-price per unit 
does not depend upon his individual evaluation of the public good. 
That is, individual evaluati9ns do not.determine tax-prices. Individ-
ual tax-prices depend, in the. e~ample, upon the distribution of taxable 
27 property values. There is therefor~ no incentive for the individual 
to conceal true preferences. 
This aspect of behavior is.absent because we have postulated 
that a specific tax scheme is pre-selected, externally to 
the chooser, and that his owrt action cannot modify the 
26see Duncan.Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958). 
27Assuming different valuesof property owned in the example, with 
equal preferences, the result would be different tax-pricesfor each 
individual. The differential tax-prices are still not dependent upon 
individual evaluations of the public good. Since the predetermined 
constitution specifies that the public good is to be financed by im-
position of the property tax, resulting differences in tax-prices among 
individuals depends upon the distributiort of ta~able property.values. 
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tax-price per unit at which the public good is made avail-
able to him,28 
Thus, when tax institutions are preselected, there is no reason to 
expect that individuals will behave·strategically when making collective 
fiscal decisions. 
Summary 
The individualistic, rather than the organic, concept of govern-
ment is accepted as the basis of analysis in this study. According to 
the individualistic view, there is no "public interest" above and beyond 
the interests of individuals composing the collective organization. 
Individuals ultimately determine resource allocation to the public 
sector. As individuals accomplish this task through political insti-
tutions; it is assumed that the basic value motive is utility maximi-
zation. This does not imply a selfish value pattern on the part of 
individuals. On the contrary, both hedonistic and altruistic motiva-
tions are assumed to be represented in individual utility functions. 
Individuals evaluate marginal costs and benefits associated with var-
ious governmental expenditures in terms of their own utility functions. 
A pure-public good implies production units for joint consumption 
by individuals. In the case of a pure-public good, consumption ex-
ternalities are reciprocal because benefits are indirect. A quasi-
public good involves both specific (private) and collective benefits, 
Individual consumption elements thus combine private own-consumption 
28Buchanan, Public Finance in Democratic Process, p. 14. The 
individual does have some control over his tax-price per unit, This 
control is present, in the example, because the individual may choose 
to not own taxable property. 
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and spillover pure-public aspects. In the evaluation of benefits de-
rived from quasi-public goods; the individual estimates these benefits 
in terms of his own utility function. 
Economists, primarily Musgrave and Samuelson, have emphasized the 
indivisibility of benefits from public goods and services among indi-
viduals as being a crucial problem. Since the exclusion principle does 
not apply, under any voluntary-exchange concept, individuals are moti-
vated to conceal their true preferences for public goods. Such moti..,.. 
vation is present due to the.belief that an individual can affect his 
own tax-price without any noticeable effect upon the public-good 
supply. Some political process, which in some fashion reveals true 
preferences, must serve as an alternative to a market mechanism in 
collective fiscal choice situations. 
Buchanan argues that institutions can be so organized as to elim-
inate the motivation for individuals to conceal true.preferences for 
public goods. Expenditure proposals are normally decided upon within 
a given tax institution. That is, expenditures are voted upon by 
individuals with the awareness that taxes will be allocated to them on 
the basis of a predetermined constitution. In this setting, the in-
divi.dual has no direct method of altering his per unit tax-price. A 
s:i,mple collective decision model, assuming direct democracy and major-
ity rule, is used to illustrate that individual evaluations of public 
goods do not directly affect the per unit tax-price when the tax 
institution is predetermined. 
CHAPTER III 
AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF LOCAL EDUCATION EXPENDITURES 
WITHIN THE UTILITY .MAXIMIZATION FRAMEWORK 
An economic model of local education spending, based upon the in-
dividualistic framework presented in Chapter II, is developed in this 
chapter. This represents an attempt to remedy some of the shortcomings 
f9und in previous studies. To indicate what has been done, an overview 
9£ recent studies purporting to explain governmental activity is pre-
sented. The studies use statistical techniques to analyze variation in 
expenditure patterns among governmental units such as municipalities, 
states, and counties. Although great differences exist in terms of the 
unit of analysis and variables used to explain expenditure variations, 
some general uniformities emerge. Without going into detail regarding 
each major study, the generalizations gleaned from examination of this 
literature are presented here. 
The procedure used to develop a model of local education spending 
is to isolate what appear to be the most relevant variables affecting 
the.individual demand for this service. First, the.level of local edu-
cation spending is examined in an "other things equal" framework. Then 
an attempt is made to identify other key variables and specify the 
manner in wh.ich they relate to individual demand for local public edu-
cation. 
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Studies of Governmental Expenditures 
Since the publication in 1952 of SolomonFabricant's ~Trend.£!.. 
1 Government Activity in the United States Since 1900, there has been a 
proliferatic>n of studies dealing with the determinants of governmental 
. 2 
expenditures. No attempt is made here to review this extensive volume 
of literature. Some general comments, however, are in order regarding 
most of these empirical investigations. 
Although different levels of government have been studied, two 
questions receive the focus of attention in the majority of studies ex-
amining the determinants of public expenditures. A host of socio-
economic variables, such as income, population density, and urbaniza-
tion, are used in.different combinations to explain observed variation 
in expenditures. The questions asked have been how important is each 
1solomon Fabricant; The Trend of Government Activity in the United 
States Since 1900 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
1952). 
2some examples are: Robert F. Adams, "On the Variation in the 
Consumption of Public Services," Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. XLVII (November 1965), pp. 400-AOS;John, C. Bollens, ed~,, 
Exploring the Metropolitan Community (Berkeley: University of Cali:-
fornia Press, 1961); Harvey E. Brazer, City Expenditures in the.United· 
States (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1959); 
Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government Expendi-
ture: A Preliminc;try Analysis," National Tax Journal, Vol. XIV (Decem-
ber 1961), pp •. 349-355 and "Interstate Variation in State and Local 
Government Expenditure, 11 ~ational Tax Journal, Vol. XVIII (March 1964), 
pp. 57-74; Werner Z. Hirsch, "Expenditure Implications·of Metropolitan 
{;rowth .and Consolidation," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol,, XLI · 
(August 1959), pp. 232-241; ErnestKurnow, "Determinants of State and 
Local Expenditures Reexamined, 11 National Tax Journal, Vol. XVI (Septem-
ber 1963), pp. 252-255; Seymour Sacks and Robert Harris, "The Determi-
nants of State and Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental 
Flows of Funds," National Tax Journal, Vol. XVII (March 1964), pp. 78-
85; Seymour Sacks and William F, Hellmuth, Jr~, Financing Government in 
~ Metropolitan Area: The Cleveland Experience(New York: Free Press 
of Glencoe, 1961); S. Scott and E. L. Feder, Factors Associated with 
Variations. in Municipal Expenditure (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1957). 
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variable in explaining expenditure variations and µow much of the var-
iation is explained by all the variables in combination. 
The statistical method used to answer these questions is usually 
some form of multiple linear regression analysis~ Predominantly cross-
section studies are made. Various functional expenditure categories 
are designated as dependent variables and the several socio-economic 
characteristics are viewed as the set of independent, or explanatory, 
variables. The regression model then becomes 
where 
(1) Y .. =f(x1 ., x 2 ., ••• , xk.) + u. 1] 1 1 1 1 
Y .. =the actual per capita expenditure of the ith unit on the jth 
1J 
function 
(Xii' x2i, •.. ,Xki) = the k independent or explanatory variables 
U. = a random term. 
1 
A measure of the over-all explanatory power of the model is given by 
the coefficient of determination (R2). This coefficient indicates the 
percent of variation in the dependent variable explained by the chosen 
set of independent variables. The most common methods used to assess 
relative importance of independent variables are partial correlation 
coefficients, elasticity coefficients, and beta coefficients. 3 
3A partial correlation coefficient indicates the degree .of assoc-
iaticm between the dependent variab;l.e and a single independent variable 9 
holding all other independent variables constant. 
Elasticity coefficients indicate the percentage change in a de-
pendent variable associated with a one percent change in a single in-
dependent variable, holding all other independent variables constant. 
Since elasticity coefficients are relative measures, they are directly 
comparable. 
Beta. coefficients also permit relative comparisons among independ-
ent variables since these coefficients involve standard units of 
measure. A beta coefficient measures the association that a change of 
29 
Statistical analyses have been carried out both within and among 
states. The unit of analysis is quite diverse. Some·studies examine 
combined state-local expenditures; some use only state expenditures; 
some consider only local expenditures; others study only municipal ex-
penditures; others limit.the analysis to jurisdictions within a metro-
politan area; while still other studies aggregate local expenditures 
within a county area to obtain an analytical unit. Partly because of 
this diversity, a summary ot each major study would not appear to con-
tribute to the analysis here. 
It is also difficult to compare studies in this area because dif-
ferent investigators use differing arrays of independent variables. 
Thus the various coefficients generated by the regression analyses are 
not generally comparable among studies. Some generalizations are pos-
sible, however. An examination of these studies reveals that near 
unaminity exists concerning the importance of income. Along with in-
come, urbanization and population density have been used as the ''basic" 
variables explaining expenditure variation. Intergovernmental revenue--
Federal and state aid--is considered a crucial variable. It is also 
generally concluded that each expenditure function should be investi-
gated separately. 
Several of the studies mentioned above include educational spend-
ing as one of the functional categories analyzed. In addition, a few 
one standard deviation in a specific independent variable has with the 
standard deviation of the dependent variable. The beta coefficient 
indicates the relative importance of each net regression coefficient 
in the estimating equation. A net regression coefficient gives the 
change in the dependent variable associated with a one unit change in 
an independent variable, the·effect of other independent variables being 
taken into account. R~gression coefficients are not directly comparable 
because their magnitude depends.upon.the unit of measure for the in-
dependent variable. 
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studies concentrating only on .educa.tional outlays have been conducted. 
Besides the basic income, density, and urbanization variables, several· 
0th.er independent variabl.es thought. to be specifically related to edu-
cation are.usually included in the analysis. These are Federal and 
state .aid, the number of school age.children in relation to population, 
the proportion of children enrolled in private schools, property valu-
ation, the percentage of the population which is non-:-:white, .and the 
5 percent of students in secondary grades. 
A major criticism of most of these empirical studies is·that.it 
is not always clear what pul;'pose the analysis is supposed to serve. 
Thqs, Morss.observes.that 
While thel;'e has been a large outpouring of statistical 
analyses purporting to explain state and local expenditures 
or.some.aspect thereof, there has been little written con-
sideration given to the purpose these analyses are to serve.5 
(footnote omitted) This is unfortunate, for these purposes 
should. be of primary importance ·in .. deciding on the research 
approach to be taken.6 
Sometimes the objective appears to involve discovering new independent 
4 Examples are: George A. Bishop, "Stimulative Verses Substitut:ive 
Effects of State Aid in New England," National Tax Journal 9 Vol. XVII· 
(June 1964), pp. 133-143; Otto A. Davis, "Empirical Evidence of Politi-
cal Influences Upon the Expenditure Policies.of Public Schools," The 
Public Ec~nomy of Urban Com~unities (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkin-;--
Press, 1965), pp. 92-111; Werner Z. Hir!;lch, "Determinants of Public 
Education Expenditures," National Tax Journal; VoL XIII (March 1960), 
pp. 29-40; Jerry Miner, Social and~onomic Factors in Spending for 
Public Education (Syracuse:. Syracuse University Press, 1963); Edward F. 
Re~shaw, 11Note on the Expenditl)re Effect of State.Aid to Education," 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXVIII (April 1960), pp. 170-74; and 
Sherman Shapiro, "Some Socioeconomic Determinants of Expenqitures for 
Education: Southern and Other States Compared," Comparative .Education 
Review, Vol. 6 (October 1962), pp. 160-166. 
5 Miner, pp. 55-56. 
6 Elliott R. Morss, "Some.Thoughts on·the Determinants of State and 
Local Expenditures," National Tax Journal, Vol. XIX (March 1966), pp • 
. 96-97. 
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variables that step up the explanatory power of the model. An increase 
:in R2 over that obtained by a previous study is certainly viewed with 
great satisfaction. The explanatory power of the model is important; 
it should not be the primary objective, however. To provide a theoret-
ical framework within which the analysis proceeds should be an initial 
obj ective. The questions asked then flow from the theoretical construc-
tion. Most of the previous studies present no theoretical framework. 
Also, the problem of intercorrelation among independent variables is 
usually not adequately dealt with. For example, the Miner study uses 
some 20 independent variables in the regression analysis. Some of the 
variables are rather highly intercorrelated. When this is the case, · 
the prec i sion of measures indicating separate effects is in doubt. Some 
technique for dealing with the problem of multicollinearity should be 
considered, A major objective of the present inquiry is to avoid these 
shortcomings. 
Objective of Study 
A premise of this study is that individuals make fiscal choices. ·' 
It is further assumed that individuals are utility maximizers. There~ 
fore individuals make fiscal choices to maximize utility as they view 
it in terms of their own utility functions. This then implies that it 
becomes necessary to examine individual demand for public goods. 
The objective of the present study is to develop _and empirically 
test an economic model of local public education spending. The quant'ity 
of public education demanded is a function of the tax-price, other ' 
things equal. Other things which are expected _toinfluence the demand 
for local public education are the type of institutions providing the 
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service (dependent or independent school district), preference vari-
ables (income, education, the extent of private education which reflects 
the availability of substitutes, and the racial composition of the 
community), and state and Federal aid to local education. 
A Model of Local Governmental Spending 
A simple model of local governmental spending can be derived from 
7 the familiar propositions of demand theory. In the theory of consumer 
choice, it is assumed that the individual attempts to maximize utility 
subject to .a budgetary constraint.. Assume that the decision-making 
unit is the family and that the individual family unit knows its util-
ity function, money income, and prices of all goods and services. The 
theory of consumer choice indicates that the family unit seeks some 
combination of purchases which maximize 
where 
(1) ui 
Ui = utility function of the ith family 
zt quantity of the kth private good purchased by the ith 
family 
gt expenditure of the local government on tth public 
good 
7The formulation here follows James L, Barr and Otto A. Davis, "An 
Elementary Political and Economic Theory of the Expenditures of Local 
Governments," The Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XXXIII (October 
1966), pp. 149-::-Y65. 
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The family budget provides a constraint upon consumer behavior. In· 
order to derive the family budgetary constraint, assume that the only 
source of revenue for th.e local government is the property tax and the 
constitution specifies an annually-balanced budgeto Thus, for the 
local governmental unit, by definition 
where 
m 
(2) \ fu rP, J 
r = tax rate on assessed property value 
P. assessed value of the jth unit of taxable property within 
J 
the jurisdiction 
The family budget constraint then becomes. 
where 
n 
(3) ~ 
Li 
k=l 
i 
= y 
pk price of the kt.h private good 
Pi assessed value of taxable property owned by the ith family 
i y = annual money income of. the.ith family 
An alternative form of the budget constraint is derived by substitution 
of r from equation (2) into equation (3). This substitution yields 
~ "> gt i L_J pi i (3 I) L pkZk + = y I P, J 
The family unit then seeks some combination of purchases which maximizes 
(1) subject to (3') o Maximization of (1) subject to (3') by use of a 
Lagrange multiplier produces the necessary conditions for consumer 
maximiz.ation in the private goods market as 
(4) 
where 
i 
u -k 
= 
= O,k 1,2, •.• ,n 
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In equilibrium, the Lagrange multiplier Ai is equal to the common value 
of the ratios~ to pk. Thus, 
i 
(5) 'A. i ul 
- = 
P1 
i 
u2 
P2 
= 
i 
u 
n 
Pn 
The parameter Ai may then be thought of as the ith consumer's marginal 
utility of income. The result obtained from the traditional theory of 
consumer. choice is derived from. ( 4) • Thus, 
(6) 
indicates that the consumer equates price and the weighted marginal 
utility of the kth good in order to maximize satisfaction. 
Using Lagrangian procedures again, the necessary condition for 
maximizing local government expenditures is derived: 
(7) ut / pi 
= 
"?.: P, 
J 
where 
= 
Equation (7) may be rewritten as 
(8) 
I: p O 
J 
O,t = 1, 2, . , o ,.m 
Equation (8) implies that if the ith family is not a property owner 
(Pi= O), it will prefer a.level of spending on the.tth local public 
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good that equates .the family's marginal utility of expenditure to zero. 
If the ith family owns .property (p\; O), the preferred level of spend-
ing on the tth local public good is one that equates the family's mar-
ginal utility of expenditure weighted by the reciprocal of ),.i to the 
ratio of the family's assessed property value over the assessed value 
of all taxable property in the jurisdiction. The ratio indicates the 
percentage of assessed local property owned by the ith.individual resid-
ing in the jurisdication, Individuals will, other things equal, prefer 
a smaller local expenditure on gt the larger.this percentage·becomes. 
i . 
Th4s, P /~ Pj appears to be a crucial determinant of local expenditure 
decisions. The ratio, in fact, performs the function assigned to prices 
in th.e traditional theory of consumer choice. 8 
Other Factors Affecting Individual Choice 
There are probably many factors that enter into the individual 
decision process regarding public expenditures. The utility maximiza-
tion assumption regarding individual motivation allows for many diver:se 
utility functions among individuals. As such, the assumption in and of 
itself offers little guidance in determining factors related to indi-
vidual demand for public goods. Almost any fiscal outcome observed 
could probably be accounted for by some version of the utility .maximi-
zation model. Used in this manner, however, the model would become 
useless as an explanatory device. Thus, some restrictions must be 
8Ibid., p. 152, 
,., 
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placed upon variations among individuals in order to derive meaningful 
propositions about the expenditure variable. The task at this point is 
to identify key variables and specify the manner in which they affect 
individual choice behavior. 
Type of School District 
Individuals·are assumed to determine local education outlays on 
the basis of a cost-benefit decision calculus. The institutions through 
which costs and benefits are presented to the individual are assumed to 
influence individual choice. Institutions become relevant to the ex-
tent that the same public good is proviqed through different institu-
tions. The Bureau of the Census distinguishes.between two types of 
governmental institutions which provide public education: 
(1) Those which are administratively and fiscally independ-
ent of any other government and are classifieq for Census 
Bureau reporting of governmental data as independent school 
district governments; anq (2) those which lack sufficient 
autonomy-to be classified as independent governmental units •. 
Each of the latter, for Census statistics, is treated as a 
dependent agency of some other government-- ••• 9 
The independent school districts.represent the largest group of special-
purpose governments in the country. As a government, the independent 
school district performs only the education function. In performing 
the educational responsibilities, the independent school district 
essentially has administrative and·fiscal autonomy. Education services 
provided by dependent school districts are a product of multipurpose 
governments such as counties and municipalities. Education in this 
9 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments: 1962, VoL I, 
Governmental Organization (Washington, D. C.: U. s~ Government Print-
ing Office~ 1963), pp. 5-6. 
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arrangement represents a part of the "bundle" of services provided by 
some governmental unit, 
Implicit in the analysis of fiscal choice thus far is the assump-
tion that the individual chooses.preferred quantities of a public good, 
one.at a time, within a given tax institutiono This framework depicts 
a system variously described as earmarking, revenue dedication, or 
revenue segregation. The independent school district corresponds to 
this kind of system. General-fund financing, which corresponds to the 
dependent school district arrangement, is the alternative to an ear-
marking system. Earmarking is a preferred fiscal institution from the. 
standpoint of the individual as he makes fiscal choices. 10 Under an 
earmarking institution, the individual can; conceptually, make a sep-
arate cost-benefit analysis concerning each public outlay. In this 
manner a more efficient allocation via the individual voter's choice. 
calculus .is achieved. It should be emphasized that the term earmarking 
does not refer to a situation where a specific tax is constitutionally 
dedicated to a specific expenditure function without annual review. 
Most earmarking arrangements are probably of the nature where the pro-
ceeds from a given tax are automatically allocated to a specific func-
tion each budgetary period. 
In making collective fiscal decisions under the general-fund 
lOA k' ' ' ' ' h ' d . h k f K n earmar ing institution is emp asize int e war o nut 
Wicksell. See "A New Principle of Just Taxation" in Richard A. Musgrave 
and Alan T. Peacock, eds., Classics in the Theory of Public Finance 
(New York: St •. Martin's Press, 1964), pp. 7 2-118. Erik Lindahl' s 
theory of the public sector, derived within the individualistic concept 
of government, also implies a system of earmarking. On this point, see 
Leif Johansen, "Some Notes on the Lindahl Theory of Determination of 
Public Expenditures," International Economic Review, VoL 4 (September 
1963), pp. 346-358. 
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institution, individuals determine the total amount to be spent on a 
group of public goodso Allocation among specific functions composing 
the bundle is made by the budgetary authority. A bundle arrangement 
must create a considerable amount of uncertainty for the individual as 
a participant in collective fiscal choice. 
If this mix is not announced in advance to the voter-taxpayer, 
he must try to predict the outcome of another decision· 
process, in which he may or may not participate, a process 
that need not exist at all in the more straight~forward ear-
marking model where all revenue sources are specifically 
dedicated O 11 
Economists have almost universally condemned the practice of earmarking, 
or dedicating, tax revenues. A standard type of statement on earmark-
ing is that. 
Probably the worst danger to good budget practice .in state 
governments is the dedication of particular funds, from 
which particular activities .are financed, By this system, 
income is channeled into any number of separate accounts, 
large and small, with little opportunity for transfer 
between accounts.12 
The segregation and earmarking of special receipts for 
special purposes has the effect of removing from budget 
practice its real reason for being--the intelligent control 
of expenditures.13 
It is thus argued that the earmarking fiscal institution imposes 
constraints upon budgetary choice with a consequent in.ferior allocation 
of funds. Buchanan suggests that the censure of earmarking derives 
from the view of the budgetary authority as a "person" confronted with 
a situation analogous to that of an individual seeking to maximize his 
11 Buchanan, Public Finance in Democratic Process, p. 73. 
12Philip E, Taylor, The Economics of Public Finance (3d ed., New 
York: The Macmillan Coo,-y"g61), po 30.~ 
13rbid,, po 32. 
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utility in the private marketo Constraints on choice in the market 
situation would limit the individual to an,inferior position on his 
utility surface, 
Buchanan argues that this private market analogy is not appropriate 
to the analysis of collective choice. The reference system should not 
be that of a budgetary authority~ but that of the individual as he con-
fronts budgetary alternatives. Viewed within the individualistic frame-
work, earmarking is closely analogous to the situation confronting an 
individual in market choice, In the private sector, an individual 
usually purchases each good or service separately, within the limits 
allowed by complementarity, and bases the purchase decision upon a cost-
benefit evaluationo Only under a fiscal institution involving revenue 
segregation is the individual as a collective decision-maker in a 
15 position approximately comparable to the private market analog. 
Another aspect of the disapproval of earmarking as an institution 
relates to the usual concept of earmarking without annual budgetary 
review. Criticism of automatic allocation of revenues from a specific 
tax source to a specific public good is valid, In this situation, ex-
penditures are automatically determined by the amount of revenue gen-
erated by the tax institution. Thus, no type of budgetary control 
exists under an earmarking institution of this natureo Certainly, an 
earmarking system without an annual reevaluation of costs and benefits 
does not contribute to a rational allocation of resources to the public 
14 Buchanan, Public Finance in Democratic Process, p, 730 
15Ibid, 
16 
sector. 
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General-fund financing of public goods, contends Buchanan, has its 
counterpart in the private sector tie~in sales arrangement, In the 
private market tie-insale, the individual is forced·to take a bundle of 
goods within which the component mix is independent of the individual's 
17 preferences. Tying arrangements in private markets can be viewed as 
a device to extract a portion of the buyer's consumer surplus by forcing 
h . . k O 11 h O h O 18 im into ma ing an a or noting c 01ce, In the public expenditure 
case of general-fund financing, the individual is also forced into pur-
chasing a bundle of goods where the mix is determinecl independently by 
the budgetary authority, Margolis has suggested that specific projects 
within.a general-fund budget generate consumers' surpluses to the. 
extent that individuals are willing to vote for the entire package 
rather than lose the specific project. 19 
For purposes of illustration assume tllat only two services, police 
protection and education, are provided collectively in the community 
d 'd O 20 un er consi eration, Further suppose, to eliminate.the uncertainty 
. " 
16For implications of this concept of earmarking see Elizabeth 
Deran, "Earmarking and Expenditures: A Survey and a New Test," 
National Tax Journal, Vol. XVIII (December 1965), pp. 354-361. 
17on tie-:-in sales see M. 1, Burstein, "The Economics of Tie-In 
Sales," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 42 (February 1960), 
pp. 68-73 and Ward S. Bowman~ro, "Tying Arrangements and the Leverage 
Problem," Yale Law Journal, VoL 67 (March 1957), pp. 19-36, 
18B . urstein, p. 68. 
19Julius Margolis, "Metropolitan Finance Problems: Territories, 
Functions, and Growth," Public Finances: Needs, Sources, and Utiliza-
tion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p, 24Z:-
20The following analysis is based upon Buchanan, Public Finance 
in Democratic Process, pp, 74-82. 
41 
inherent under the general-fund arrangement, that the budgetary mix is 
made known to all individuals prior to collective decision making on 
expenditures. Also assume that the tie-in is defined in terms of the 
specific proportion of the total budget which is allocated to each of 
the two public services. There exists some budgetary mix which produces 
the same results irrespective of the institutional form. 
That is to say, there will always be one budgetary ratio that 
will cause the individual to "vote for" the same relative 
quantities of the two services and the same total public out-
lay under general-fund financing that he would "vote for" 
under complete earmarking. This unique solution may be called 
"full equilibrium" for the individual, and this solution may 
be used as a starting point for the.more extended analysis.21 
As a point of departure, assume that the.full equilibrium ratio pre-
vails. Then, by assumption, the given budgetary mix produces no dif-
ferential impact upon individual choice as between institutions. The 
individual will desire the same quantity of services and spending level 
under either institution. 
Differing results under the two institutions are derived when 
other than the full equilibrium ratio is presented to the individual 
in the general-fund arrangement. To illustrate; assume that earmarking 
has prevailed but a change to the general-fund institution is made. 
Further assume that the budgetary ratio is changed to favor education 
relative to police protection. Since the new budgetary ratio now 
favors educational services, this suggests more education .and less 
police protection is demanded by the individual in the tie-in institu-
tion than is the case when full equilibrium prevails. Thus, a budget-
ary ratio other than the full equilibrium one will produce distortion 
21Ibid., p. 76. 
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d 1 f d fi . 22 I b . f d in individual choice un er genera - un nanc1ng. · n e1ng orce ·. 
to purchase a bundle of services the individual moves to some less pre-
23 ferred position on his utility surface. The assumption here is that 
education is favored by the budgetary ratio in the general-fund insti-
tutional arrangement. This is likely to be the case, for 
Public services, like education, that provide differentially 
higher benefits to particular subgroups in the community 
(in this case families with children) will tend to be rel-
atively more demand elastic than services that are more 
"general" in benefit incidence (say, police protection). By· 
requiring taxpayers who do not secure direct benefits from 
publicly provided educational services to purchase general 
community services such as police only through a tie-in 
arrangeiµent with education, some "tax-payers' surplus".is 
captured, as Margolis has suggested. The bachelor who might 
vote against additional school district taxes (and expend-
itures) may vote for additional taxe~4 to finance a bundle 
of services that.includes education. 
The institution for provision of local education must thus be consider-
ed as a factor which affe~ts behavior as the individual participates in 
fiscal choice .decisions. 
Preference Variables 
There is no well-defined body of economic theory which can serve· 
as a guide to selection of preference variables. Preferences represent 
the 11givens 11 of economic.analysis.and in relation to public goods the 
preference area is not well understood. Furthermore, empirical research. 
22 Ibid. 
23Ibid. 
24James M. Buchanan, "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes," Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. LXXI (October 1963), p. 466. 
25 
seldom deals with individual preferences for public goodso 
There is almost unanimous agreement among economists that income 
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is positively associated with public expenditures. Such an income=re-
lated preference is an essential ingredient of models depicting indi-
vidual behavior in private market choice situationso The assumption 
here is that individuals have positive income-related preferences for 
public as well as private goods. 
It may be argued that this assumption is inconsistent with a nar-
rowly conceived view of self-interest. A narrow concept of self-
interest produces the following individual calculus reasoning, In 
evaluating an expenditure increase proposal, the individual calculates 
both the additional benefits and costs which will affect him should the 
proposal be approved by community residents. If the estimated addi-
tional benefit exceeds the additional cost, the utility-maximizing 
individual will vote in favor of the proposal, Since local systems 
are financed primarily by property taxation, low-income residents in 
the com.m4nity are likely to be more in favor of increased spending than 
would be high-income groups. This is because the relative cost is 
gre~ter for the upper-income individuals, to the extent that these in-
dividuals also own property of greater value, since the ratio of 
25 see, however, the following: William C, Birdsall, "A Study of 
the Demand for Public Goods," in Richard A. Musgrave, ed., Essays in 
Fiscal Federalism (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1965), 
pp, 235-294; Elizabeth Likert David, "Public Preferences and State-
Local Taxes," in Harvey E. Brazer, ed., Essays in State and Local 
Finance (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, The University 
of Michigan, 1967), pp. 74-106; Eva Mueller, "Public Attitudes Toward 
Fiscal Programs," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol, LXXVII (May 
1963), ppo 210-235; James Q, Wilson and Edward C, Banfield, "Public 
Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," American Polit-
ical Science Review, VoL 58 (December 1964), pp. 876-887, 
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benefits .to cost declines for them as income increases, Thus, assuming 
a narrow version of the self-interest motivation, higher-income individ-
uals could be predicted to indicate less support for public programs 
than lower-income individuals, 
This result is not, however, expected if a broader co~cept of 
self-interest is used, as is done here. The higher-income individual, 
to a greater extent than.lower-income individuals, may recognize and 
value more highly the "spillover" benefits accruing to other individ-
uals generated by public expenditures. Individuals, in regard to edu-
cation spending, may value highly living in a community where education 
receives a generous share of public resources, A certain sense of 
security may derive from living in a community where well-informed 
citizens emerge from the local educat,ional system, 
It is likely that income per se does not produce this result. The 
level of education attained by the individual is interwoven with in-
come as an explanatory factor,. The educational process should suf-
ficiently broaden.individual horizons to the extent that their utility 
functions take into consideration the benefits from public spending 
that accrue to other individuals, Presumably, the greater the level of 
educational attainment, the more likely the individual is to take this 
view, Thus, it .is assumed that the more education an individual has, 
the more.accurately he is able to evaluate benefits from educational 
spending. This further implies, in the present context, a greater pref-
erence for educational spending. However, since education and income. 
are generally closely associated, their individual influence on. 
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educational spending may be difficult to ascertain. 26 
An important concept in the demand for a good or service in the 
theory.of private consumer choice is the availabil.ity of good substi-
tutµes. Private education offers a substitute for public provision of 
the educational function. To the extent that families prefer a private 
education for their children, the demand for public educational services 
is reduced accordinglyd It is therefore assumed that a greater percent-
age of pupils attending private schools is associated with a lower 
level of public education outlays, 
The racial composition of the community is also expected to exert 
an influence upon local expenditure decisions. A greater presence of 
non-whites in the community is expected to result in a lower level of 
local public educational outlays. The negative association between non-
whites and local educational spending is expected for two reasons. 
First, non-white preferences for educational services may not be effec-
27 tively registered because of their exclusion from the voting process. 
Secor;rl, to the extent that non-white preferences for education are 
registered they may be lower than white preferences.for educational 
services, The non-white may attach a smaller benefit to education be-
cause of expected job-discrimination after the educational process is 
completed. Again, it may be difficult to evaluate the relative 
26The · problem of intercorrelati.on among independent variables is 
treated in Chapter IV where the statistical model is developed, 
27 This is part.icularly relevant here because of the region chosen 
for an empirical test of the educational spending modeL As .discussed 
in the next chapter, Virginia and South Carolina are chosen for an 
empirical evaluation, For discussion and analysis of southern politics 
wherein disenfranchisement of non-whites is dealt with, see V. Oo Key, 
Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, Inc., 1949), 
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i' 
importance of this variable because it is probably closely associated 
negatively with both income and educational attainment. 
In summary, two characteristics of individuals are assumed to be 
positively associated with higher public spending on local education, 
These characteristics, which are termed preference variables, are in-
come and educational attainment, Two other preference variables, the 
percentage of pupils attending private schools and the percent of non-
whites, are assumed to be negatively associated with local public edu-
cational spending, 
Federal and State Aid 
Education expenditures usually involve significant amounts of 
Federal and state aid, These funds are primarily state subsidies to 
local school districts. Such subsidies should not alter the benefit 
aspect of the individual calculus, They do, however, affect the cost 
side of the individual cost-benefit decision framework, In essence, 
the aid is analogous to a price decrease where the locality is able to 
purchase additional units at a discount. Thus, it is postulated that 
state and Federal aid to education is positively associated with local 
spending on the education function, Several recent studies suggest 
the prevalence of such an association, 28 These studies have, however, 
28 see Roy W, Bahl and Robert J. Saunders, "Determinants of Changes 
in State and Local Government Expenditures," National Tax Journal, VoL 
XVIII (March 1965), pp, 50-57; "Factors Associated with Variations in 
State and Local Government Spending," Journal of Finance, Vol. XXI 
(September 1966), pp, 523-534; George A, Bisho~ "Stimulative verses 
Substitutive Effects of State Aid in New England," National Tax Journal, 
Vol. XVII (June 1964), pp, 133-143; Ernest Kurnow, TrDeterminants of 
State and Local Expenditures Reexamined," National Tax Journal, VoL 
XVI (September 1963), ppo 252-255; Jack W. Osman, "The Dual Impact of 
Federal Aid on State and Local Government Expenditures," National Tax 
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been criticizeq for the manner in which .the aid variab.1,e is used in the 
1 . 29 ana ysis. The amount of per capita Federal aid to tp.e function being 
considered is usually design~ted as one of the independent variables in 
the regression analysis. The dependent variable, per capita expendi-
tures, includes the aid component as .well as outlays financed from own. 
sources. Thus, as indicated above, the usual regres~ion model becomes 
where 
Y .. = the actual per capita expenditure of the ith unit on the jth 
l.J 
function (includes aid to jth function) 
(X1i,x2i, ••• ,Xki) = the k independent or explanatory variables 
Ui = a random term 
Let Xk represent the amount of per capita aid for the jth function. 
A 
The estimated regression coefficient bk of the aid variable then indi-
cates.the change in Y associated with a unit change in per capita .aid 
(Xk) • If O<bk <l th~n aid is defined as subs ti tu tive .. Al though per cap-
ita spending on thejth function increases as per capita atd increases, 
per capita spending from local sources on the jth function is reduced. 
Journal, Vol. XIX (December 1966), pp. 362-373; and Seymour Sacks and 
Robert Harris, "The Determinants·of State and Local Government Expend-
itures and Intergovernmental Flows of Funds," Natiqnal Tax Journal, 
Vol. XVII (March 1964), ppc 75-85. ~ 
29 See Elliott R •. Morss, "Some Thoughts on the Determim;mts. of 
State and Local Expenditures," N~tional Tax Journal, Vol. XIX (March 
1966), pp. 95-103; Wallace E. Oates, "Th.e Dual Impact of Fed~ral Aid 
on State and Local Government Expenditures: A Comment," National Tax·. 
Journal, Vol. XXI (June 1~68), pp. 220-223; Thomas F. Pogue and L.G. 
Sgontz, !'The Effect of .Grants-in-Aid on State-:-Local Spending," 
National Tax Journal, Vole XXI (June 1968), pp. 190-199. 
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Thus, aid has in effect been substituted for local revenue sources. In 
the usual formulation, if 'i\>1 then aid is defined as stimulative, 30 
That is, for each dollar increase in per capita aid on the jth function, 
per capita spending on that function increases by more than one dollar, 
In.this case aid has then had the.effect of stimulating per capita out-
lays from local revenue sources on the jth function •. The estimated aid 
I\ 
regression coefficient.bk is usually thus interpreted as a measure of 
the cause-effect relationship between aid and local spending, The 
causality is assumed to be a one-way relationship running from aid to 
local spending, 
Fisher argues that this interpretation may not be valid. 31 Aid 
may in part be determined by expenditures. For certain types of aid, 
such as those.with matcqing-grant provisions, more aid is the result of 
more spending from own .sources. Thus, aid in this case· cannot be said 
to determine expenditures since aid and expenditures are functions.of 
each other and are simultaneously determined. 
A Pogue and Sgontz argue that a non-zero value of bk in equation (1) 
' t d d f h f 11 ' d' ' 32 is expec e un er any o t e o owing con 1t1ons: 
1) Expenditures aredetermined, in part, by aid payments 
with expenditures hav~ng no effect on aid payments, 
2) Aid payments are determined, in part, by expenditures 
with aid payments having no effect on expenditures, 
3) Aid payments and expenditures are jointly determined, 
i.e., a function of each other. This is essentially 
Fisher's case. 
30This is not always clearly stated, For example, Sacks and Harris 
have been criticized by Morss for their failure to note that expendi-
tures from own funds are not increased by aid unless'b'k:'l. 
31F, h 1.s er, "Interstate·Variation in State and Local Government 
Expenditure," 
32 Pogue and Sgontz, p, 192. 
4) At least some of the factors determining expenditures 
also influence aid; and, the set of variables x1 , •• ,,Xk-l 
does not include all of these common determinants. 
Instead, some of the factors which influence both aid 
and expenditures are included. in the error term (U). 
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Only if statements 2, 3, and 4 are invalid can it be concluded that the 
estimated aid regression coefficient is an unbiased estimate of the 
casual influence of aid on expenditureso 33 In evaluating the impact of 
aid upon spending, an implicit assumption has been that statements 2, 
3, and 4 are 1·n fact 1'nval1"d. 34 H · th t f 'd owever, given e na ure o · some a1 
programs, ·as noted above, this becomes·a questionable assumption, 
Statements 2 and/or 3 are valid when matching provisions are associated 
with aid so that when spending from own sources increases aid payments 
increaseo The extent to which state or Federal matching funds are in-
valved appears to be the most critical point regarding using aid as an 
independent variableo 
The only grants th~t result in an increase in aid propor-
tionate to increases in local expenditures, are those that 
call for state or federal matching of local expenditures 
in some fixed ratio. Federal grants for slum clearance, 
public housing, and waste treatment works are of this type,35 
Under most state grants, if the local governmental unit increases ex-
penditures from own sources then more state aid does not result. 36 Re-
garding education, if state grants are on the basis of average daily 
attendance then two localities with different per student expenditures 
33rbid. 
34Ibid. 
35 Selma J. Mushkin, "Intergovernmental Aspects 
ture Decisions, 11 in Howard G. Schaller, ed., Public 
c1s1ons in the Urban Community (Washington, Do C.: 
Future, Inc., 1963), p, 59. 
36 Ibid,, p. 58. 
of Local Expendi-
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could receive the same amount of state aid. 37 
Statement 4 above.is more difficult to assess. It is reasonable 
to suspect that statement 4 is valid because aid may be serving as a 
proxy for variables which affect both spending and aid and these vari-
38 
ables may not have been included in the regression equationo 
Examples of factors which might be expected to influence 
both aid and expenditures are the power and attitudes of 
the political leaders of the state, the population's 
attitude toward government activity, the way in which the 
tax-expenditure process is institutionalized, and factors 2 
which affect the demand for and/or cost of public goods.l 
(footnote omitted)39 
The regression equation is then mis-specified if factors which affect 
local spending have not been included in the set of explanatory var-
iables. The·result of these omissions is that the estimated regression 
coefficients are biased if there is intercorrelation among the.in~luded 
and excluded variables. 
A factor, also illustrating statement 4, to be considered is that 
both aid an4 spending are possibly determined by the same factors. If 
this is the case, then a correlation between aid and local spending 
does not necessarily indicate a cause-effect relationshipo 40 A corre-
lation between aid an4 expenditures is expected even though no cause-
) 
effect relationship exists if aid is determined in/part.by the same 
factors.which determir:te expenditureso 41 This possibility can be 
37Ibid. 1 p. 59. The institutional arrangements regarding state 
payments to local governments for education in the study region con-
sidered here are discussed in the next chapter. 
38 Pogue and Sgontz, p. 193. 
39ibid. 
40Ibi4. , p. 198 o 
41Ibid. 
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empirically tested from the data used to generate the regression equa-
tion. Further discussion on this point is deferred to the following 
chapter. 
In summary, the use of Federal and state aid in a regression 
analysis of local spending is subject to criticism. These criticisms 
will be taken into account in this study so as to minimize the possi-
bility of obtaining a biased estimate of the aid coefficient. 
Local educational spending here does not include Federal and state 
aid. This is clearly the proper approach if the focus of the investi-
gation is upon how the institution of aid affects local expenditure 
decisions. More meaningful relationships can thus be examined by using 
the procedure adopted here. 
Summary 
Many studies have been made in recent years on the determinants of 
government spending. These studies use various combinations of socio-
economic variables to account for variation in public outlays among 
similar governmental units. The governmental units analyzed have been 
quite diverse. Cross-section multiple regression analysis is used to 
indicate how much variation can be explained and to determine the rel-
ative importance of each explanatory variable. Some studies examine 
several functional expanditure categories while others deal only with 
a specific function. A major criticism of most of these investigations 
is the absence of a theoretical framework for analysis. Also, the 
problem of intercorrelation among independent variables has not received 
adequate attention. This has resulted in questionable measures of rel-
ative importance for the various explanatory variables. Federal and 
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state aid is recognized as an extremely important variable. However, 
an examination of the literature reveals that this variable is usually 
introduced into the various.models in an unsatisfactory.manner. 
The premise underlying this study is that individuals make fiscal 
choices. Individuals are assumed to be utility maximizers and thus 
make fiscal choices so as to maximize utility as they see ito This 
then leads to an analysis of individual demand for local education. 
Using the individualistic framework for analysis, a model of local· 
governmental spending is developed. Determining the level of local 
educational spending is viewed as a constrained maximization problem. 
The family unit seeks some combination of purchases, including public 
goods, which maximizes its utility function subject to the family 
budget constraint. Within this framework, the analysis implies, other 
things equal, that the amount of property owned by an individual in 
relation to the total assess~d property in the jurisdiction is a cru~ 
cial determinant. In the formal model, this is expressed as the ratio 
of the family's assessed property.value over the assessed value of all 
taxable property in the jurisdiction. An inverse relationship between 
this ratio and preferred levels of local spending is expected, 
Utility functions are assumed to vary among individual family 
units. Several factors, which are assumed to be the most relevant, are 
introduced to account for this diversity. These factors are the type 
of school district, preference variables, and Federal and state aid, 
There are two types of institutions at the local level through 
which educational services are.provided, An independent·school district 
represents a single-function governmental unit. An independent school 
district operates essentially with administrative and fiscal autonomy. 
Educational services, in a dependent school system, represent part of 
the bundle of services provided by a multipurpose governmental unit. 
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Economists have, for the most part, censured the practice of ear-
marking tax revenues. Buchanan suggests that the nonacceptance of ear-
marking stems from viewing the budgetary authority as the reference in-
dividual. The reference system should, however, be that of the indi-
vidual voter as he confronts budgetary alternatives. Viewed in this 
manner, earmarking is analogous to the situation confronting an indi-
vidual in private market choices. Thus, under the institution of in-
dependent school district, the individual as a collective decision 
maker is in a position approximately comparable to the private market 
analog. 
Another aspect of the criticism of earmarking relates to the con-
cept that it implies a situation where revenues determine expenditures. 
Where there is no annual review of expenditure programs under an ear-
marking institution, this is an appropriate criticism. Earmarking as 
used here, however, implies a situation where the individual chooses 
in a collective decision process the revenue and expenditure levels 
each budgetary period. 
The system of general-fund financing, such as where dependent 
school districts prevail, is similar to the private market tie-in-sales 
arrangement. In this case the individual is forced to take a bundle of 
goods within which the component mix is independent of the individual's 
preferences. 
The essence of Buchanan's argument is that earmarking is a pre-
ferred fiscal instit~tion because, conceptually, the individual can 
make a separate cost-benefit analysis concerning each public outlayo 
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An.extension of the analysis implies that, under certain assumptions, 
spending on some functions may be higher under the general-fund institu-
tion as opposed to the.earmarking institution, It is postulated here 
that local education is a functional category that would tend to receive 
greater support in a general-fund arrangement. 
In addition to institutions, other variables must be considered 
which are assumed to affect the individual decision calculus in the 
process of collective choice. Individual family units are assumed to 
have positively-related income preferences in the public sector as well 
as in the private sector. The level of education in the community is 
also assumed to be positively related to local education outlays. A 
higher level of education is likely to mean that the individual values 
more highly the spillover benefits associated with education. A third 
preference variable, the extent to which pupils attend private schools, 
is assumed to reduce the demand for publicly-provided education serv~ 
ices. Also expected to be negatively associated with local education 
outlays is the percentage of non-whites in the communtty. 
Local educational spending is assumed to be positively associated 
with Federal and state aid. Local spending here refers to spending 
from own sources which excludes such aid. Aid should alter the cost 
aspect of the individual cost-benefit evaluation because a subsidy is 
analogous to a price decrease. Thus, the greater the amount of aid, 
the greater the amount of local spending on the education function. 
Studies using aid as an independent variable in a regression 
analysis have been criticized for this procedure. These criticisms are 
taken into account in the present study in an effort to reduce the 
problems associated with using aid as an expenditure determinant. 
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Expenditures here exclude aid to the function under examination. The 
major portion of aid is granted on a non-matching basiso Thus the pro-
cedure used here enables a more accurate answer to be given to the 
question of how the institution of aid affects a specific local expend-
iture decision. 
CHAPTER IV 
AN EMPIRICAL TEST 
This chapter is concerned with an empirical test of the economic 
model of local education spending developed in Chapter rn. It is 
assumed that the collective decision process can be represented by a 
model of direct democracy. The-decision rule for determining the col-
lective result is assumed to be that of simple majority-voting. The 
median-man construction thus provides a bridge between the individual 
calculus and collective decisions. 
The relevance of the whole analysis depends on the appro-
priateness of the simple majority-voting models as reflec-
tions on real-world political process in democratic govern-
men~s. Obviously decisions on taxes and public spending 
are not made in glorified town meetings; even at the .local 
government level. The critical question is whether or not 
the simplified town meeting can serve as a model with which 
we can analyze the much more complex process through which 
fiscal decisions get made. There is no way in which this 
question can be answered other than through the testing of 
hypotheses that emerge from the model against observed 
experience. The fact that, in .some superficially descrip-
tive sense, decisions do not seem to be made in this manner, 
tells us relatively little about the predictive power of the 
models.1 
The task at this stage is to therefore develop an empirical model for 
testing the theoretical model of local education spending developed in 
Chapter III. 
1 Buchanan, Public Finance in De~ocratic Process, p. 159. 
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An Empirical Model 
A form of regression analysis, regression on dummy variables, is 
used to assess the explanatory,potential of the i~dividualistic model 
of local public education spending that has been developed in previous 
2 
chapters. The economic model constructed in Chapter III provides the 
basis for selection and classification of variables to be used in the 
multiple regression analysis. 
The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is expressed here as local elementary and 
secondary public education expenditures per student in average daily 
attendance, Capital outlays are excluded from the education spending 
variable on the premise that they do not reflect the current level of 
educational services provided. Also excluded from expenditures are 
state and Federal grants-in-aid to local governmental units. The de-
pendent variable thus represents per student expenditures from local 
sources. Data are for 1962, which is the latest year for the U. S, 
Census of Governments. 
Independent Variables 
Fiscal Institution 
A dummy variable x1 is used to represent the type of fiscal insti-
tution. Values are given to x1 as follows: 
x1 = 1 if dependent school system. 
2see J. Johnston, Econometric Methods (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 221-228 on dummy variables. 
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x1 = 0 if independent school system. 
This technique permits a determination of the importance of the type 
of fiscal institution variable and provides a quantitative estimate of 
its effec'to 
Property and Voting Data Proxies 
The analysis·in Chapter III indicates that Pi/ZP., the ratio of 
J 
the family's assessed property value over the assessed value of all tax-
able property in ~he jurisdiction, is a primary determinant of local 
expenditure decisions. Assume that the level of local education expend-
itures is determined by a jurisdictional referendum. Further suppose 
that the balloting is such that each voter indicates the level of edu-
. d 0 h d ' 3 cation spen ing e esires, If the decision rule is simple majority, 
then the median preference expressed in the voting process is dominant. 
Let g1 represent the local educational service. The assumed vot-
ing process yields some median preferred expenditure level, g1 , given 
i 
each voter's preferred outlay g1 . Assuming tastes and income to be 
equal among voters, then a one-to-one correspondence exists between the 
individual preferred expenditures g1i and the ratio Pi/LP, for any given J . 
j . d' ' 4 uris 1ct1on. This correspondence defines an inverse relationship 
3As indicated above, in the general-fund arrangement individuals 
are presumed to determine only the level of total spending with the 
budgetary mix being determined independently of individual choice. The 
assumption .here is that in a conceptual sense the voting process can 
still be described in terms of a model of direct democracy. Theim-
plication for the empirical analysis is that the distortion in consumer 
choice caused by the predetermined budgetary ratio is indicated, in two. 
dimensional space, as a parallel upward shift in the regression equa-
tion. Regression coefficients are thus assumed to not be affected by 
the institutional arrangement:, 
4Barr and Davis, p, 156. 
59 
between the property ratio and the individual preferred expenditure. 5 
The larger Pi/ZPj the smaller g~. Also, e~ch median preferred expendi-
ture g1 is associated with a corresponding median ratio P/2Pj. 6 Thus, 
an inverse relationship should exist between actual expenditures and 
corresponding median property ratios. 7 However, it is not possible to 
test this relationship due to lack of data on individual property owner-
ship. Thus, following Barr and Davis, two proxies are used as an. 
alternative: 
x2 = Assessed value of property per student in the jurisdiction. 
x3 The number of owner-occupied residences in the jurisdiction. 
divided by the number of registered voters in the jurisdic-
tion. 
The relationship between x2 and per student educational spending 
is expected to be positive. Per student educational spending and x3 
are expected to yield an inverse relationship. These expected res~lts 
are based upon the following two propositions: 8 
1. An inverse relationship exists between x2 and P/:u>j. 
2. A positive relationship exists between x3 and P/~Pj. 
Regarding proposition 1, it i~ reasonable to assume that among juris-
dictions higher values of x2 are likely to occur in more.urbanized 
9 
areas. Further, in those jurisdictions, a larger percentage of the 
5rbid. 
6 Ibid. 
7Ibid. 
8 lb id . ' p ' 15 7 0 
9Ibid. 
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population is likely to be renters so that the left tail of the density 
i 10 
of the P /ZPj may be larger. Also, larger values of x2 probably occur 
where commercial and industrial properties are relatively important com-
11 ponents of the tax baseo Since a portion of these properties is like-
ly to represent absentee ownership, the owners are not included in the 
density of Pi /'i:.P. whereas the value of the property is included in ZP, •12 
J J 
Thus, it is expected that larger values of x2 are associated with small-
er values of P/ZP,, Regarding proposition 2, it appears that the larger 
J 
the percentage of home-owning voters, the more likely it is that the 
h ' h d' l3 ome-owner 1st e me 1an voter. This implies that the left tail of 
the density of the Pi/'f.Pj is smaller. 14 Thus, larger values of x3 
are expected to be associated with larger values of P/~P .. Given that 
J 
these propositions are valid, then the above relationships between per 
student expenditures and variables x2 and x3 are·implied. 
Median Family Income, Education, Percentage of Pupils Attending 
Private Schools, and Percent of Population Non-White 
The following four variables are used to indicate family prefer-
ences for local public elementary and secondary education: 
x4 = Median family income. 
x5 = Median years of school completed by persons 25 years old 
and overo 
lOibid. 
11rbid. 
12Ibid. 
13Ibid, 
14Ibid, 
x6 Percent of pupils attending private schools. 
x7 = Percent of population non~white. 
The variables x4 and x5 are expected to be positively related to 
per student educational outlays. A negative relationship between per 
student educational spending and variables x6 and x7 is expected. 
State and Federal Aid 
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To reflec:'t the impact of criteria substantially outside the local 
decision process, a state and Federal aid to education variable is used: 
x8 = Per student state and Federal aid to education. 
Variable x8 and local education expenditures per student are expected 
to be positively associated. 
Unit of Analysis 
For an empirical test of the model, this study focuses on predom-
inately non-urban county areas in Virginia and South Carolina. Initial-
ly.only those counties with a population density of up to 150 per square 
mile were selected. Then counties designated in 1960 as Standard Metro-
politan Statistical Areas were also dropped, if they had not been ini-
15 tially, from the sample. There are only four states, Hawaii, Maryland, 
North Carolina, and Virginia, where local education is financed entirely 
16 by the dependent school arrangement. Political jurisdictions in Vir-
ginia and South Carolina appear appropriate for essentially two reasons. 
15 Other counties were deleted at a later stage in the analysis. A 
discussion of reasons for deletion of specific counties and a list of 
those counties is included in Appendix B. 
16u. s. h Bureau oft e Census, Census of Governments: 1g62, Vol. 
I, Governmental Organization (Washington, D-.-C.: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1963), p. 6. 
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1. Broad Regional Differences are Eliminated - A relatively-homo-
geneous area normalizes for broad regional differences associated with 
climate, topography, sociological, and other characteristics which might 
influence local expenditure decisions. For purposes of this study, 
Virginia and South Carolina appear reasonably homogeneous. It might be 
argued that since all dependent school districts are in Virginia and 
all independent school districts are in South Carolina, the dummy var-
iable is a regional variable reflecting differing attitudes between the 
states. The posture here is that both states, being a part of the 
S h . h d' 0 • h 17 out ern region, s are a common istinctive c aracter. This is nQt 
to suggest that the South does not contain diversity. There are in 
fact many Souths, with a great deal of geographic, social, and economic 
diversity. Yet the South continues to be treated by many as a distinct 
. l . 18 regiona entity. This distinctiveness appears to be due to a state-
of-mind which keeps the South at odds with national norms. 
Though many Southerners are loath to admit it, the very 
existence of their section, because of its annoying habit 
of being out of step with the rest of the nation, is a 
standing invitation to reform and change. The region has 
sought.to remain nearly static while belonging to the most 
dynamic society in the world; it has tolerated hierarchy 
in the most democratic of nations; it has accepted race 
and class distinction in egalitarian America; it has 
remained casual or indifferent towards formal education 
in a nation which has long and lovingly held the belief 
17No attempt is made here to delineate the South. However the 
Southern region under discussion here may roughly be identified as 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, 
18The literature dealing with the South is of enormous proportions. 
In 1964 a selected bibliography of Southern history indicates that 
there were 407 scholarly journal articles published that year, No 
attempt was made by.the compiler at full coverage of Civil.War history. 
Derived from The Journal of Southern History, Vol. XXXI (May 1965), 
pp. 178-197. 
that education is the panacea for the ills of man and society; 
it has reflected an ingrained pessimism while existing among 
the most optimistic folk in history; it has embraced Romanti-
cism i~ the midst of the most practical of people, and it has 
persistently demonstrated a predilection for violence in y9 
nation which prides itself on being a government of laws. 
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Thus, the assumption here is that the states in the study region, being 
a part of the South, essentially share attitudes distinctive to the 
__ .;.;~-.. -----·---
Southern region. 20 Attitudes toward education in the South will be dis-
cussed at a later stage in the analysis~ However, since no variable is 
used to reflect attit1.1des in the empirical body of this research effort, 
it must be recognized that this may in fact be a methodological weakness 
of the study. 
2. Similar State Aid Institutions - State aid to local schools 
consists of equalizing, flat, general, and specific grants. Usually 
19otis A. Singletary, "The Contemporary South," The Texas 
Quarterly, Vol. I (Spring 1958), p, 43. 
2°For the thesis that Southern traditions persist and inhibit 
Southern economic development see William H. Nicholls, Southern Tra-
ditions and Regional Progress (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1960). The components of the Southern tradition are 
described by Nicholls as: 11 (1) the persistence of agrarian values, (2) 
the rigidity of the social structure, (3) the undemocratic nature of 
the political structure, (4) the.weakness of social responsibility, and 
(5) conformity of thought and behavior" (p. 15). 
No pretense is made here of having systematically surveyed the 
seemingly endless literature dealing with Southern values. In addition 
to the book by Nicholls, the following have helped to formulate the 
assumption of a persistent "mind of the South": Harry S. Ashmore, An 
Epitaph for Dixie (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1957, 1958); 
W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 
1941); Thomas D. Clark, The Emerging South (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1961); Wilma Dykeman and James Stokley, Neither Black nor White 
(New York and Toronto: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1957); Louis D. 
Rubin and James Jackson Kilpatrick, eds,, The Lasting South: Fourteen 
Southerners Look at Their Home (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957); 
Otis a Singletary, "The Contemporary South," The Texas Quarterly, Vol. 
I (Spring 1958), pp. 41-50; C. Vann Woodward, Origins .ei_ the New South 
1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), and 
The Burden of Southern .History (Baton Rouge~ Louisiana State Uni-
versity Press, 1960). 
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one type of aid arrangement predominates within a ,given state. To-the 
extent that the institution differs .in this respect, it might be hypoth-
esized that type of aid has a differential impact upon local decisions. 
To eliminate this possibility, a similar type of aid program as between 
financing institutions is called for. State.aid in both Virginia and 
South Carolina is predominantely 011 a non-equalizing basis.and employs 
essentially similar criteria in dispensing the major portion of educa-
21 tion aid to local governments. A large portion of state aid to.local 
education in.Maryland is on.an equalizing basis. Local governmental 
units in·North Carolina are not primarily responsible for the education 
function. In this state, local education is essentially a state ad-
ministered and financed program. 
In South Carolina, 72.9 percent of the .amount of state payments t_o 
local governments for non-capital education expenditures in.1962 was 
based upon the amount required to pay teachers according to a state-
22 prescribed salary schedule. The number of teachers any givenschool 
may-qualify .depends upon average daily attendance. Thus, average daily 
attendance is.the essential criteria for dispensing this portion of 
state aid. An additional 8.6 percent of state payments for non-capital 
education spending in.1962 was based directly upon the number of pupils 
enrolled. Therefore, some 82 percent of state payments in 1962 was 
determined on the basis of pupils either enrolled or number in average 
daily attendance in the district. For this major portion of aid, 
districts having differing expenditures per student could receive the 
21This observation is based upon.U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census 
of Governments: 1962, Vol~ VI, State Payments to Local Governments. 
22Ibid. 
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same amount of per student aid. Thus, the bulk of state aid in South 
Carolina in 1962 was not determined by e~penditures. That is, greater 
spending per student from local sources does not imply greater state 
aid per student. A small amount of state payments (involving both 
state.and Federal funds) was distributed on the basis of some fixed 
• 1 1 do 23 ratio to· oca expen itures. These state payments amounted to 6.6 
percent of to_tal state payments to localities for non-capital education 
outlays. 
A similar picture regarding aid emerges for Virginia. In 1962, 
67.5 percent of state payments to local governments for non-capital 
education spending was detertl).ined by average daily attendance or per. 
pupil enrolled. 24 Only 11.9 percent of state payments involved distri-
bqtion on the basis of some rat~o·to.local spending.· 
Th~ implication for the analysis here is that aid to localities, 
for the most part, is not determined by expenditures. Thus, by sub-
tracting aid.from the dependent variable, a reasonably accurate measure 
of spending from local sources is obtained. To the extent .that some 
aid involves matching, local expenditures are overstated and the result-
ing regre~sion coefficients are to some extent biased. For the study 
region involved, however, thi$ is very minimal since matching aid is 
relatively unimportant. 
·Preliminary·Analysis 
A preliminary examination of the raw data indicated th~t private 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid. 
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school enrollment is relatively insignificant for the study region. 
Many of the counties involved have less than one percent of the chil-
dren enrolled in private elementary school. Also, several counties in 
each state indicate no private elementary school enrollment according 
to census data. Thus, it was decided to delete the private school 
enrollment variable from further consideration. 
It was indicated in Chapter III that studies similar to th~ present 
one seldom attempt to deal with the. problem of multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity is present when.a high degree of correlation exists 
among some or all of the independent variables. Some intercorrelation· 
among the independent variables may be severe enough ·to leave the 
reliability of measures indicating separate effects in doubt. Consider 
the following: 
Yi =f1 (X1 ,x2 , •.. ,X~f, 
xl = ~2<x2 ,x3, '· · ,xk) • 
Obtaining the separate effect of x1 on Yi requires holding 
(X2,x3 , ••• ,Xk) constant. But is is unrealistic to do this since 
changes in x1 are associated with changes in the remaining k-1 inde-
pendent variables. The computed correlation coefficients,. regression 
coefficients, and beta coefficients would thus not l;>e precise esti,.. 
mates of the true relationships. 
Examination of simple correlation coefficients among the quanti-
tative independent variables serves to identify the existence of multi-
collinearity. Table II presents the matrix of simple correlation co-
efficients for the selected quantitative independent variables. Table 
II indicates that median family income and median years of school 
completed have a relatively high positive correlation coefficient of 
TABLE II 
MATRIX OF SIMPLE GORRELATION COEFFICIENTS, SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Variable 
x2; Assessed Value of Property 
per Student 
Number of Owner-
X , Occl,l.pied Residences 
3' Number of Registered 
Voters 
x4; Median Family Income 
x5 ; Median Years of 
School Completed 
x7; Percent Non-White 
x8; Per Student ~tate and 
Federal Aid to Education 
2 3 
1.00000 .47225 
1.00000 
Variable Number 
4 5 7 
.40176 .20553 -.26280 
.30330 .21644 -.22514 
1.00000 .63073 -.58841 
1.00000 -.35518 
1.00000 
8 
-021545 
-.05234 
-.17259 
-.10570 
.07469 
1.00000 
°' -..J 
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0.63073, Median family income alsp exhibits a relatively.high negative 
correlation of -0,58841 with the percent non-white variable. On the 
basis of these and remaining intercorrelations, median family income is 
deleted while both median years of school completed and percent non-
white are retained, Simple correlation coefficients among the remain-
ing variables do not appear high enough to warrant further deletion. 
Results£!__ the Statistical Analysis 
Table III presents the results of the statistical analysis. 25 An 
encouraging result from the overall analysis is that the model explains; 
over 66 percent of the variation in per student local elementary and 
secondary spending in the study area. Strong support thus emerges for 
the individualistic model of local education spending developed in 
Chapter III. All variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 
level except x3 , the number of owner~occupied residences divided by the 
number of registered voters, and x5, median years of school completed. 
Since the number of owner-occupied residences divided by the 
number of registered voters is serving as a proxy, it may be that it 
does not sufficiently approximate the theoretically-constructed vari-
able. The preliminary analysis described in Appendix B supports this 
observation. Thus, the variable may be associated with per student 
local elementary and secondary spending but the empirical measure of 
the variable is not capable of indicating such an association. 
The non-significance of the education variable is apparently due 
to its relationship with the percent non-white variable, This is 
25A step-wise program is used to obtain the multiple regression 
results. 
TABLE III 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND t VALUES·OF·SELECTED. 
VARIABLES ON PER STUDENT LOCAL·ELEMENTARY·AND SECONDARY· 
EDUCATION EXPEN])ITURES, SELECTED COUNTIES IN 
V.IRGINIA AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1962 
Variable 
x1; Dependent School Distric~ 
x2; Assessed Property Value 
per Studen.t 
Number of Owner-
Occupied Residences 
Number of Registered 
Voters 
x5 ; Median Years of 
School Completed 
x7; Percent Non-White 
x8; Per Student State and 
Federal Aid to Education 
Regression 
Coefficient 
24.1280 
0.0084 
-0.1609 
6.8389 
-0.3386 
-0.5626 
Multiple R2 = 0.6626; F = 33.1894** 
*Significant at the .05 level. 
**Significant at the .01.level. 
Standard 
Error. 
9. 7719 
0.0015 
0.2016 
5.2748 
0.1539 
0.2492 
t 
Value 
2.4691** 
5.5043** 
0.7979 
1.2965 
2.1992* 
. 2 .2571* 
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indicated because if percent non-white is deleted from the regression 
then median years of school completed becomes significant at the O .01 · 
level. Also, deletion of median years of school completed while re-
taining percent non-white results in the latter variable showing in-
creased significance (from the 0.05 level to the 0.01 level). 26 
All s{gns of the regression coefficients except one are consistent 
with the theoretical formulation. A most interesting result is that 
the sign of the aid variable coefficient is negative rather than the· 
expected positive. This means.that an increase in per student state 
and Federal aid to education is associated with a decline in per stu-
dent local elementary and secondary outlays. This implies that indi-
viduals at the local level choose to allocate fewer local funds to the 
education function as Federal and state education aid to the locality 
is increa$ed. 
The negative association between educational aid and local educa-
tional outlays may be explained by regional competition for residents 
and industry. A fear of losing industry may induce local residents to 
limit spending out of local revenue since higher service levels would 
require increased local property, or other taxes. If it is felt that 
low taxes are necessary to attract industry, any local tax increase 
would be met with considerable resistance. State and Federal aid to 
education may then serve as an alternative to local tax increases. On. 
the surface, this explanation certainly appears plausable. A deeper 
examination, however, suggests other possibilities. 
26see Appendix C for these comparative results. Appendi.x C also 
indicates that median family income can be used in the regression when 
both.median years of school completed and percent non-white are deleted 
and the overall result is essentially the same. 
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It may be argued that the Southern quest for industrialization is 
more apparent than real in some areas" 
Considering the desperation with which most county seat towns 
in the South appear to be competing for industrial plants, 
one might at first doubt that any antagonism to industrial-
ization remains even in the most rural areas" Nonetheless, 
in every such community there are important socio-political 
leaders who see in both industrialization and outmigration 
a threat to their traditionally high social status and their 
economic self-interest" Particularly where the plantation 
organization of agriculture still prevails, the relatively 
few but politically powerful large planters see in. either 
outmigration or local industrialization the destruction of 
the plentiful and cheap farm labor supply which for a 
century has been the very foundation of their economic 
existenceo Where a rural community has already attracted 
one or more low-wage plants, its Chamber of Commerce is 
typically dominated by local industrialists who look upon 
further industrialization merely as competition which would 
drive up local industrial wages, and so they drag their 
feet against efforts to lure other industry into the 
community.27 
Thus, the assertion that localities compete fiercely for industry may 
not be valid for the essentially rural study region" 
The unexpected regression result may be symptomatic of a tradi-
tion in Southern attitudes toward public education. A prejudice against 
free public schools is a part of the Southern heritage. 28 It can be 
argued that even today there exists in the South an attitude which 
reflects a generally low preference for public education. Thus~ 
The blunt fact is that far too much of the South's conserv-
ative socio-political leadership, particularly that import-
ant segment rooted in, the "'rural Black Belt/'<: (footnote 
omitted) has remained indifferent or even antagonistic to 
27Nicholls, p. 1250 
28For a general history of public education in the South, see John 
Samuel Ezell, The South Since 1865 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1963), pp. 241-2760 
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the whole idea of univ29sal public-school education right 
up to the present dayo 
The historic prejudice in the South against universal public education 
is due to several thingso 30 Among them are the following: an aristo-
cratic .view by Southerners of public education as being for paupers; 
the .idea. (from the Reconstruction period following the .Civil War) that 
public education represented a Northern attack upon Southern institu-
tions; the consideration by many Southerners of education as being a 
family matter under parental authority; and the fear that the Negro 
might become.equal in status to whites as a result of the educational 
process. As a result of these traditional attitudes, many Southerners 
are then quick to resort to the idea of private schools when major edu-
31 
cational problems face them. After nearly .a century of making sub-
stantial inroads to breaking down these prejudices, the historic 1954 
Supreme Court decision in the Brown v 0 Board of Education of Topeka 
case provided the South with a major problem. Many Southerners were 
indeed shocked by the overturning of the separate but equal doctrine 
which had prevailed since 1899 as a result of the Plessy Vo Ferguson 
decision. That integrated schools were to be the law of the land put 
the South in a terrible quandry. Integrated schools ran counter to one 
of the most cherished of Southern traditionso As a result of the 1954 
decision, throughout the South many turned to the idea of providing 
private schools with st.ate funds o These plans did not, however, for 
29Nicholls, pp. 110-111. 
30 See Ezell, ppo 241-276. 
31 Clark, Po 1500 
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h O lo 32 t e most part mater1a 1zeo With Virginia's failure to succeed with 
its program of massive resistance, as the South looked to Virginia for 
leadership along these lines, the future course of Southern education 
became clear, The Supreme Court decision was not to be avoided, Thus, 
it may be that in the study region the view is that if public education 
is to mean integrated schools, then less local support is preferred as 
state and Federal funds. to localities are increased, The negative 
association between state and Federal aid and local per student spend-
ing may then be explained in.terms of a.traditional antagonism against 
public schools compounded by the .realism that public education means 
integrated schoolso If these attitudes prevail, individuals in the 
study region may then view an increase in state and Federal aid as an 
opportunity to reduce support from local sources, 
It was indicated in Chapter III that both aid and spending may be 
determined by the same factors. To obtain an indication of the rela-
tionship between aid and the other variables associated with expendi-
tures, state and Federal aid per student was regressed on the.variables 
which were significantly associated with per student local education 
spending. A multiple R2 of 0,1274 was obtained from the regression, 
This result suggests that the aid variable is determined only to a 
slight extent by the same set of factors associated with expenditures 
per st1,1dent, Thi.s further adds credence to the implication that the 
cause-effect relationship runs from aid to expenditureso The possi-
bility exists, however, that variables which are important have been 
32For an essentially political account of Virginia's abortive 
massive resistance attempt see Benjamin Muse, Virg:;l..nia's Massive 
Resistance (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1961)" 
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omitted from the analysis and these variables and aid are significantly 
associated. 
Summary· 
Use of a regression model was made to test the model of local edu-
cation spending developed in Chapter II!o Regression on dummy vari-
ables is_the technique used in the empirical analysis. Per student 
local elementary and secondary public education spending represents the 
dependent variable in tQe regression model. The dependent variable is 
a measure.of per student expenditures from local sources since both 
.. ' capital outlays and state and Federal grants are excluded o 
Several independent variables, deriving from the utility maximi-
zation framework of Chapter III, are U$ed in the_regression model. A 
dummy variable is .used to represent the type of fiscal institution. A 
value of one is assigned to this variable if the school system is.de-
pendent, otherwise a zero is given to the dummy variable. 
The analysis of Chapter III indicated that a primary determinant 
of local governmental expenditures is the ratio of the family's 
assessed property value _over the assessed value of all taxable property 
in.the jurisdiction. An extension of that analysis implies that an 
inverse relationship should exist _between actual outlays' and correspon<;i-
ing median property ratio$. Since the lack of data on individual prop-
erty ownership precludes testing this relationship, two proxies are 
used as an alternative. These are the assessed value of property per 
student in the jurisdi~tion and the number of owner-occupied residences 
in the jurisdiction divided by the .number of registered voters in the 
jurisdiction. It is hypothesized that the former proxy.is positively. 
. associated with local per student education spending while the latter 
is inversely related to local education spending per student. It is 
argued that these results are likely to be empirically, rather than.a 
priori, trueo 
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Median family income, median years of school completed, the per-
centage of pupils attending private schools, and percent non-white were 
selected to indicate family preferences.for local education, A nega-
tive association with per student education spending was expected for 
both the percentage of pupils attending private schools and percent non-
white. A positive relationship was expected between the dependent var-
iable and the remaining two family preference variables, 
Per student state and Federal aid to education is a variable which 
should reflect the impact of such programs on local expenditure deci-
sions. A positive association between local education expenditures per 
student and the aid variable was expected to emerge. 
County areas in Virginia and South Carolina were chosen for an 
empirical test of the model. These states appear appropriate because 
their selection eliminates broad regional differences affecting local 
expenditure decisions and state aid arrangements are similar, Both 
regional differences and differing types of aid institutions·might be 
expected to have a differential impact upon local decisions. With re-
gard to region~! attitudes, it is .assumed here that both states in the 
study region share a distinctive Southern tradition. This appears 
particularly appropriate since the county areas included in the -anal-
ysis are essentially rural areas where it may be presumed that an 
agarian tradition prevails, An essential homogeneity in attitudes is 
necessary since all dependent school districts are in Virginia and all 
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independent districts are in South Carolina. Without homogeneity in 
attitudes the dummy variable may then be interpreted as reflecting re-
gional differences in attitudes rather than indicating the effect of 
the institutional arrangement for providing public educational serviceso 
In both South Carolina and Virginia, state payments for non-
capital education spending to localities depend primarily upon per stu~ 
dent in average daily attendance or per student enrollment. Theim-
portant implication for the analysis is that this indicates that local 
spending does not determine aid. Then the procedure of subtracting aid 
from total spending to arrive at spending from local sources is reason-
ably accurate and more confidence can be placed in the estimated re-
gression coefficients. 
Preliminary analysis indicated that private school enrollment is 
relatively unimportant in the study region, On the basis of an exam-
ination of the raw data, the private school enrollment variable was 
thus deleted from the set of independent variableso In order to mini-
mize the effect of multicollinearity, one further variable was also 
dropped. Simple correlation coefficients indicated that a rather high 
degree of association existed between median family income and both 
median years of school completed and percent non-white, Median family 
income was thus dropped from the analysis, 
Results of the multiple regression analysis lend support to the 
individualistic model of local public educational spending, The model 
explained over 66 percent -0£ the variation in local per student educa-
tion spending, All variables except two were statistically significant 
at the 0,05 level, The number of owner-occupied residences divided by 
the number of registered voters did not indicate a significant 
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association with per student local education outlayso This result is 
perhaps due to the fact that the variable is serving a proxy role and 
thus does not adequately represent the theoretically-constructed var-
iable. Median years of school completed also did not indicate a sig-
nificant association with local per student education spendingo This 
result was apparently due to the association between percent non-white 
and median years of school completed, 
Only one regression coefficient sign was inconsistent with the 
theoretical formulationo A negative, rather than the expected positive, 
association between the aid variable and local per student education 
spending emergedo A possible explanation for the negative relation-
ship may be found in the concept of regional competition for industryo 
A fear of losing industry may induce local residents to limit public 
spending from local sources since increased service levels imply in-
creased taxeso Educational aid might then serve to release local funds 
from the education function so that they can be allocated to remaining 
local functionso Additional educational aid thus serves to limit tax 
increases at the local level in support of non-aided functionso This 
result may also be due to a lack of general support for public educa-
tiono Southern tradition points to lack of general support for a 
system of public schools, A reinforcement of this attitude emerged as 
a result of the 1954 Supreme Court decision requiring integration of 
public schools. 
The results of this inquiry indicate that, for the most part; in 
the study region aid and spending are not determined by the same set of 
factors. A regression of state and Federal aid per student on the re-
maining variables indicating a significant association with per student 
local spending yielded a multiple R2 of only 0.1274. This lends sup-
port to the hypothe~is that aid is a determinant of local expenditure 
decisions. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Economists have, for the most part, not attempted to construct a. 
theory of governmental spending that is analogous to the usual neo-
classical market theory of consumer choice. In most economic models 
depicting how the economy functions, governmental spending is consider-
ed an exogenous variable. Governmental outlays are assumed to be deter-
mined by a political process through complex political institutions. 
The concern of economists. has traditionally been with examining the 
effects of taxing and spending upon economic units. Little attention 
has been devoted to individual participation in collective fiscal 
choice. This lack of attention may have been justified when government 
was such a relatively minor part of the economic landscape. However, 
given the current importance of the amount of resources d~voted to col-
lective use, some modification in emphasis seems in order. 1 
In a broadly democratic setting, individuals must ultimately allo-
cate resources to public as well as private use. Common observation 
indicates that individuals do participate in collective choice deci-
sions. 
Man behaves, man chooses, in many other capacities than that 
of simple buyer and seller in the market place. Man behayes 
politically. He .votes when given the opportunity, or chooses 
1 Buchanan, Public Finance in Democratic Process, p. 3. 
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to abstain from votingo He joins pressure groups. He makes 
campaign contributions. He runs for officeo He writes 
letterso Can this behavior be subjected to scientific 
analysis?2 
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One approach to explaining collective choice has been examined and 
evaluated in this studyo The analysi.s of fiscal choice has been limited 
to the local education function. An economic model of local education 
spending was developed and empirically tested. A model of direct de-
mocracy was postulated wherein individuals were assumed to vote directly 
on local spending for public education. The individual family unit was 
assumed to vote on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. 
The contention here is that such a model, although descriptively 
unrealistic, might be a useful explanatory device. The cross-section 
regression analysis of Chapter IV lends support to this assessment. 
Variables thought to be important in the family decision process were 
generally found to be significantly associated with local expenditure 
variations within the study region. The selected set of independent 
variables explained over 66 percent of the variation in per student 
local education spending. In one case 1 state and Federal aid to educa-
tion, the sign of the regression coefficient was the opposite from what 
was expected. Each dollar of state and Federal aid per student to local 
education is associated with a fifty-six cent reduction in per student 
spending on education from local sources. The regression result indi-
cates that state and Federal aid to education is su'!:~stituted for local 
revenue sources. This result has some interesting implications" 
The results here will be satisfying to those who view the shift 
away from local school support to state and Federal sources as a healthy 
2Ibid., po 170. 
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trend. The argument is that high non-local support is equivalent to 
higher standards for the local education service. High levels of local 
support are, likewise, viewed as implying low local education standards. 
However, if additional school aid is viewed as a means of stimulating 
a better quality education (assuming that per student expenditures are 
a rough indicator of quality), then the results here are not encourag-
ing. One of the most persistent arguments in favor of aid to education 
is that it serves to increase expenditures per pupil. As indicated in 
Chapter III, several studies indicate such an association, These re-
sults, however, are probably due to improper model construction wherein 
a positive bias results from partly correlating aid with itself. 
Questions involving equity in taxation are also prompted by the 
results of the aid coefficient. The regression results imply that fi-
nancial responsibility for local education is transferred from local 
governments to state and Federal governments. This means essentially 
state government responsibility since aid to education primarily in-
valves state funds. By comparison, the Federal aid component is rela-
tively small. This then involves a movement away from local property 
taxation toward state-wide sales, income, and excise taxation in support 
of local government. The result may be an even more regressive tax 
structure in support of local spending. 3 
The negative association between aid and local education spending 
per student may indicate that the individual simply feels that taxes 
levied elsewhere and spent in the local jurisdication represent an 
3The fiscal impact may, however, be quite different. The re-
d:i.stributional aspect of the fiscal process may produce a favorable net 
balance for low income groups under either the local property tax or 
the state-wide tax sources. 
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attractive proposition. The institution of state and Federal aid then 
has the effect of widening the bridge between tax and expenditure in 
the fiscal decision process. It is desirable, from the standpoint of 
rational individual decision making, to consider tax-expenditure pro..;. 
posals concurrently. State and Federal aid to local governments may 
tend to split the fiscal process, whereby the spending choice is ap-
parently removed from the taxation dectsion. This apparent removal 
creates greater uncertainty in fiscal choice than would otherwise be 
the case. These uncertainties are minimized only if the institutions 
of fiscal choice reflect that a spending decision, within a balanced-
budget framework, implies a taxing decision. Simultaneous determina-
tion of taxing and spending in collective fiscal choice situations 
serves to close the apparent splitting of the fiscal process prevalent 
under alternative institutions. In general, results to be expected 
when institutions cause an apparent divergence of the fiscal process 
are that if the individual tends to view only the expenditure (benefit) 
aspect without taking costs into. account then expenditures will tend to 
be higher than the level that would be produced when the individual is 
fully informed. 4 Conversely, if the individual decision calculus fails 
to incorporate the benefit aspect and only the tax side of the fiscal 
account is considered, then expenditures will be lower than would be 
desired were the individual fully informed. 5 
An important aspect of aid, although not dealt with in this study, 
is the possible association between type of aid (flat grant, equalizing, 
4Buchanan, Public Finance in Democratic Process, p. 92. 
5rbid. 
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etc.) and local spending decisions. If the aid variable had been pri~ 
marily based on some equalization procedure in the present study, then 
the negative aid coefficient. would have been interpreted differently. 
When aid is granted on an equalization basis; then a negative associa-
tion is expected. A causal relationship is not implied under these 
circumstances and a negative coefficient would indicate that the equal-
ization program is effective. Since differing aid institutions are 
expected to produce different; results upon individual choice, studies 
assessing the differential impact·of varying aid institutions upon 
local spending decisions should add to our understanding. Given that 
aid has .certain objectives, such studies would indicate the extent to 
which the objectives are fulfilled. 
The area of preferences for public goods is not well understood. 
Preferences represent the "givens" of economic·analysis and there is no 
well-defined body of theory which can serve as a guide to selection of 
preference variables. Empirical research has seldom dealt with individ-
ual preferences for public goods. Since some 34 percent of the varia-
tion in the dependent variable in this study was unexplained, this im-
plies that important preference variables may not have been taken into 
account. Research .must be undertaken in the preference area if our 
understanding of public spending decisions is to be enhanced, Both 
survey techniques and the study of actual voting data appear relevant. 
Survey techniques would be particularly important in probing the area 
of how well citizens are informed. To what extent do citizens vote. 
upon .collective outcomes without considering either the cost or benefit 
side of the fiscal account? Do ins.titutions cause this apparent 
splitt:ing of the fiscal process? If so, which ones? Such studies 
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would be important in devising techniques to provide voters with in-
formation in order that rational individual decisions. can. be made on 
allocating resources to public use. It may well be that a considerable 
educational process is necessary before individuals can make informed 
judgments upon such decisions. 
It is clear that in a democracy individuals must in the final 
analysis allocate resources to public use. Thus, an individualistic 
approach to e:x:plaining fiscal outcomesis appropriate; The present 
study lends support to the contention that individualistic collective 
decision models have explanatory potential. Fiscal institutions can 
introduce a great deal of uncertainty and possible distortion into the 
individual choice calculus. This need not exist if institutions are 
organized so that the individual can make rational decisions based on 
informed judgment. From the standpoint of the individual as a partici-
pant in fiscal choice, an earmarking institution is preferred. In-. 
formed individual choice can only be made when the individual is able 
to evaluate adequately both sides of the fiscal account. 
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TABLE A-I 
COUNTIES INCLUDED IN STUDY AREA AND VALUES OF DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Column 1: 
Column 2: 
Column 3: 
Column 4: 
Column 5: 
Column 6: 
Column 7: 
County (1) 
Independent Districts 
(South Carolina): 
Abbeville 101 
Allendale. 65 
Anderson 112 
Bamberg 28 
Barnwell 45 
Beaufort 33 
Berkeley 51 
Calhoun 34 
Cherokee 98 
Chester 82 
·chesterfield 51 
Claredon 25 
Colleton 54 
Local Education Expenditures per Student ($) 
Assessed Value of Property per Student ($) 
Number of Owner-Occupied Residences divided by 
the Number of Registered Voters (%) 
Median Family Income($) 
Median Years of School Completed 
Percent Non-White(%) 
Per Student State and Federal Aid to Education($) 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
1,474 55.0 3,641 8.3 
1,357 42.7 2,188 7.4 
1,994 57.1 4,191 8.6 
1,189 50.1 2,380 7.9 
1,994 32.3 3,266 8.5 
1,271 56.2 3,597 9.9 
563 69.6 3,367 7.7 
1,273 68.1 1,766 7.7 
1,559 38.0 3,686 7.6 
1,725 48.6 3,700 7.8 
908 43.4 2,811 7.6 
593 57.9 1,945 7.1 
873 59.6 2,462 7.8 
(6) 
32o0 
63.1 
19.5 
55.8 
43.4 
38,8 
49.7 
67,2 
2Ll 
40,l 
37,l 
68,3 
5Ll 
(7) 
149 
157 
155 
157 
168 
196 
166 
158 
149 
155 
168 
143 
156 \.0 
I-' 
TABLE A-1 (CONTINUED) 
County (1) (2) (3) 
Darlington 85 1,256 48.1 
Dillon 25 927 38.6 
Dorchester 41 1,184 54.7 
Edgefield 113 1,322 49.6 
Fairfield 70 1,863 50.4 
Florence· 38 1,083 45.1 
Georgetown 72 1,579 51.4 
Greenwood 94 1,838 44.6 
Hampton 80 1,462 49.6 
Horry 56 1,116 53.1 
Jasper 73 1,432 60.7 
Kershaw 76 1,926 49.2 
Lancaster 98 1,676 34.3 
Laurens 55 1,485 63.4 
Lee 46 930 39.7 
McCormick 19 1,157 45.6 
Marion 49 945 49.9 
Marlboro 87 1,398 35.2 
Newberry· 80 1,730 52.7 
Oconee 62 1,362 55.3 
Orangeburg 80 1,035 55.4 
Pickens 66 1,488 55.9 
(4) (5) 
3,231 8.1 
2,356 7,3 
3,031 8.3 
2,595 8.4 
2,730 7.3 
3,232 8.5 
3,160 7.6 
4,175 8.7 
2,487 7.5 
3,019 8.7 
2,401 6.7 
3,538 8.3 
4,482 8.3 
4:tl45 8.1 
1,680 7.3 
2,639 7.6 
2,307 7.9 
2,465 7.4 
3,341 8.6 
3, 721 8.1 
2,603 8.2 
4,503 8.4 
(6) 
44.4 
46.5 
49.0 
58.2· 
59.5 
43.2 
52.1 
29.6 
53,9 
26.8 
62.4 
39.8 
27o0 
29.5 
65.7 
61.8 
55.0 
48.9 
35.5 
10 0 7 
60.1 
10.1 
(7) 
150 
149 
161 
129 
148 
148 
146 
151 
154 
164 
161 
158 
156 
153 
148 
165 
146 
159 
153 
169 
152 
150 
\0 
N 
TABLE A-I (CONTINUED) 
County (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Saluda 54 1,691 42.1 2,965 9.0 36.8 158 
Sumter 58 1,252 72. 7 3,267 9.3 46.9 168 
Union 71 1,430 40.2 4,115 7.8 29.6 145 
Williamsburg 45 623 57.8 1,631 7.4 66.5 144 
York 102 1,600 51.3 4,3l8 8.6 28.6 137 
Dependent Districts 
(Virginia): 
Accomack 126 3,580 94.8 2,817 7.9 38.7 157 
Albemarle 198 6,333 93.0 4,516 9.7 14.9 139 
Amelia 111 4,700 49.1 2,715 7.5 51.4 163 
Appomattox 159 6,202 57.1 3,495 8.0 25.6 169 
Augusta 144 7,165 83.1 4,352 8.7 4.4 146 
Bath 194 8;767 59.5 3,218 8.5 9.2 164 
Bedford 121 4,329 78.0 3,886 7.9 19.4 145 
Bland 103 2,216 56.8 2,594 7.8 3.4 166 
Botetourt 158 5,157 69.9 4,035 8.5 9.1 152 
Brunswick 88 3,933 58.3 2,506 7.4 58.7 163 
Caroline 94 3 ,-983 79.3 3,658 7.8 52~6 160 
Charolette 125 3,332 44.9 2,864 7.4 40.0 161 
Clarke 140 6,495 43.5 3,691 8.5 17.3 160 
Culpepper 101 7,104 51.3 3,661 8.5 27.6 143 
Cumberland 103 3,651 63.3 2,013 7.4 54.2 172 
\0 
w 
TABLE A-I (CONTINUED) 
County (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dinwiddie 109 4,945 57.1 3,762 7.1 61.8 166 
Essex 146 9-, 137 93.7 3,407 8.3 47.5 159 
Fauquier 166 9,153 74.3 3,929 8.5 25.9 129 
Floyd 129 3,275 52.1 2,994 7.5 5.2 171 
Fluvanna 209 14,472 97.6 3,223 7.6 37.9 152 
Frederick 118 5,149 71.8 4,125 8.3 1.9 151 
Giles 183 8,030 66.3 4,209 8.8 2.7 150 
Gloucester 45 6,168 70.6 3,769 8.3 28.2 161 
Goochland 109 7,835 52.5 3,313 7.5 48.1. 159 
Grayson 71 1,701 56.9 2,978 7.5 3~9 175 
Greene 86 3,856 63.0 2,925 7.3 12.2 167 
Greensville 81 3,608 46.5 2,936 7.0 54.9 15-S 
Halifax 85 3,313 73.0 2, 724 7.5 44.5 167 
Hanover 136 5,335 80.8 5,012 9.4 25.3 150 
Isle of Wight 128 4,586 48.8 3,780 7.8 52.5 165 
King and Queen 152 3,525 90.9 3,162 7.5 53.0 168 
King George 129 4,374 75.1 4,803 9.1 27.0 189 
King, William 55 8,537 91.1 3,913 8.2 47.1 153 
Loudoun 171 9,561 47.8 4,460 8.8 17.7 134 
Lunenburg 86 3,645 73.2 2,871 7.9 42.2 165 
Madison 135 4,560 61.8 2,908 7.9 22.3 154 
Mecklenburg 90 3,484 70.3 2,779 7.9 46.9 169 
Middlesex 155 6,562 78.8 2,808 8.2 41.5 154 
Montgomery 118 4,008 88.0 4,180 8.8 : 4. 6 154 
Nansemond 54 2,830 72.0 3,496 7.5 63.1 162 \0 
~ 
TABLE A-I (CONTINUED) 
County (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Nelson 133 4,165 53.1 3,088 7.4 27.9 159 
New Kent 161 5,520 57.7 3,901 8.0 52.8 164 
Northumberland 163 8,144 58.5 3,241 8.1 42.5 149 
Nottoway 130 5,081 73.8 3,485 8.3 42.6 154 
Orange 161 7,899 83.4 3,831 8.5 22.4 140 
Page 127 3,284 50.6 3,705 8.1 3.1 148 
Patrick 99 2,957 70.2 3,322 7.3 9.1 175 
Pittsylvania 87 3,582 95.7 3,363 7 .4 34.2 157 
Pulaski 126 3,752 84.6 4,222 8.2 6.7 147 
Rappanannock 131 3,820 60.5 2,903 7.0 17.5 147 
Richmond 177 6,339 84.6 3,352 7.6 34.6 164 
Rockbridge 186 7,097 74.4 4,175 8.1 8.2 1% 
Rockingham 135 6,824 95.7 3,971 8.8 1.8 146 
Russell 89 5,938 56.9 2,933 7.3 1.9 166 
Scott 62 1,361 54.1 2,637 7.5 L2 165 
Shenandoah 125 6,440 74.4 3,812 8.2 1.6 142 
Smyth 84 2,212 65.0 3,940 7.9 1. 7 168 
Southampton 98 4,559 64.8 2,964 7.4 57.8 156 
Spotsylvania 135 6,823 59.4 4,375 8.0 22.8 152 
Stafford 123 4,855 87.6 4,821 9.1 11.7 147 
Surry 103 5,967 63.1 2,694 7.5 64.8 141 
Sussex 113 3,974 49.6 2,581 7.3 66.3 142 
Tazewell 70 2,199 58.8 3,622 7.8 4.5 143 
Warren 204 11,175 67.5 4,790 8.7 7.2 139 
Washington 131 1,722 89.2 3,347 8~0 2.5 146 \0 
l..n 
TABLE A-I (CONTINUED) 
County. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Westmoreland 
Wise 
89 
67 
187 
6,212 
2,377 
3,378 
53.5 
76.7 
32.7 
3 ,-051 
3,450 
3,235 
7.6 
7.3 
7.8 
46.6 
2.9 
4.4 
156 
154 
152 Wythe 
Source: Column 1: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments: 1962, Vol. IV, No. 4, Compend1.um 
of Government Finances (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964); 
Annual Report.of the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, School Year 1961-1962 (Richmond: State. Board of Education, 1962); Ninety-
Fo.urth Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Education, State of South Carolina, 
1961-1962-(Columbia: State Budget and Control Board, 1962). 
Column 2: U. S. Bureau of the .Census, Census of Governments: 1962, Vol. II, Taxable Property 
Values (Washington,. D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963); Annual Report of 
the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the .Commonwealth of Virginia, School Year 
1961-1962 (Richmond: State Board of Education, 1962); Ninety-_FourthAnnual Report of 
the State Superintendent of Education, State of South Carolin~, 1961-1962 (Columbia: 
State Budget and Control Board, 1962). 
Column 3: U. S. Bureau of the Census, U. ~· Census of Housing: 1960, Vol. I, States and Small 
Areas, South Carolina (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962); 
U. S. Bureau of the Census, U. ~· Census ·of Housing: 1960, Vol. I, States and Small 
Areas, Virginia (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Pr~nting Office, 1962); Voter. 
registration data obtained from the State.Board of Elections in Richmond, Virginia 
and the office of the Secretary of State, State of South Carolina in Columbia, s.c ... 
\C 
O' 
TABLE A-I (CONTINUED) 
Column.4: U. S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1960, General Social and 
Economic Characteristics, South Carolina (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government. · 
Printing Office, 1961); U. S. Bureau of the .Census, U~. E.· Census of Population: 
1960, General Social and Economic Characteristics, Virginia (Washington, D. C.: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961). 
Column 5: Same as Column 4. 
Column 6: Same as Column 4. 
Column 7: Ninety-Fourth Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Education, State of 
South Carolina,·· 1961-1962 (Columbia: State Budget and Control Board, 1962); Annual 
Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
School Year 1961-1962 (Richmond! State Board of Education, 1962). 
\0 
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APPENDIX B 
98 
99 
COUNTIES NOT INCLUDED IN STUDY. 
Altho,ugh private school enrollment is relatively unimportant fol'.'. 
most counties in the study region, a few counties indicate a substantial 
amount of private elementary school enrollment. In Prince.Edward 
County, Virginia, for example, nearly 88 percent of elementary school 
enrpllment is private. Thus, in order to have some homogeneity in the 
sample, the.few counties exhibiting over 10 percent private elementary 
school enrollment were dropped from the sample. 
Other difficulties in tQe data also necessitated deleting more· 
counties. In Virginia~ several counties indicate, by the proxy.measure,. 
that in excess .of 100 percent of the registered voters are homeowners. 
Since_this.is an.impossibility, these counties were deleted from the 
sample. This may indicate that the chosen empirical measure is not a 
good representation of the theoretical ideal. A few counties in both. 
state~ also indicated extremes in the percent non-white variable. Thus~ 
those counties having less than one percent and over 80 percent non-
white populations were ·also dropped from the analysis~ 
The-following counties were then deleted from the sample for one 
or more of the above reasons: 
South Carolina: 
Aiken 
Charleston 
Greenville 
Lexington 
Richland 
Spartanburg 
Virginia: 
Alleghany 
Amhe.rst _ 
Buchanan 
James City 
Lancaster 
Lee 
Buckingham 
Campbell 
Carroll 
Charles City 
Chesterfield 
Craig 
Dickenson 
Fairfax 
Franklin 
Henrico 
Henry 
Highland 
Louisa 
Mathews 
Norfolk 
Northampton 
Powhatan 
Prince George 
Princess Anne 
Prince Williams 
Roanoke 
Shenandoah 
York 
100 
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TABLE C-I 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND t VALUES OF SELECTED 
VARIABLES ON PER STUDENT LOCAL ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES, SELECTED COUNTIES IN 
Variable 
VIRGINIA AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1962 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t 
Value 
102 
x1 , Dependent School District 
x2; Assessed Property Value 
per Student 
24.1280 9. 7719 2.4691** 
Number of Owner-
X Occupied Residences 
3; Number of Registel'.'ed 
Voters 
x5 ; Median Years of 
School Complet~d 
x7; Percent Non-White 
x8; Per Student State and 
Federal Aid to Education 
Multiple R2 = 0.6626; F = 33.1894** 
~Significant at the .05 level. 
**Significant at the .01 level. 
0.0084 0.0015 5.5043** 
-0.1609 0.2016 0.7979 
6.8389 5.2748 1.2965 
-0.3386 0.1539 2.1992* 
-0.5626 0.2492 2 .2571* 
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TABLE C-II 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND t VALUES OF SELECTED 
VARIABLES ON PER STUDENT .LOCAL ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES, SELECTED COUNTIES IN 
VIRGINIA AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1962 
Regression Standard t 
Variable Coefficient Error Value 
Xl; Dependent School District 34.0332 8.8337 3.8526** 
X2; Assessed Property Value 
per Student 0.0077 0.0015· 5.0541** 
Number of Owner-
X3; OccuEied Residences -0.2099 0.2041 1.0283 Number of Registered 
Voters 
XS; Median Years of 
School Completed 12.1705 4, 7720 2.5503** 
X8; Per Student State .and 
Federal Aid to Eclucation -0.6378 0.2515 2.5360** 
2 0.6464; F = 37.4511** Multiple R = 
**Significant at the .01 level. 
104 
TABLE C-Ill 
REGRESSION .COEFFICIENTS; S~ANDARD ER,R.ORS, AND t VALUES OF SELECTED 
VARIABLES ON PER STUDENT LOCAL.ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES, SELECTED COUNTU:S IN . 
VIRGINIA.AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1962 
Variable 
x1 ; Dependent School District 
x2 ; Assessed Property Value 
per Student 
Number of Own~r-
Occupied Residences 
Number of Registered 
Voters · 
x7; Percent Non-White 
x8; Per Stu.dent State and 
Federal Aid to Education 
Regression 
Coefficient 
·18.0612 
0.0092 
-0.0896 
-0.4303 
-0.5362 
Multiple R2 = 0.6577; F = 39.2292** 
*Significant at the .05 level. 
**Significant at the .01 level. 
Stamiard 
Error 
8.6073 
0.0014 
0.1946 
0.1372 
0.2492 
t 
Value 
2.0983* 
6.3763** 
0.4603 
3.1367** 
2.1512*. 
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TABLE C-IV 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND t VALUES OF SELECTED 
VARIABLES ON PER STUDENT LOCAL ELE~ENTARY AND SECONDARY 
EDUCATION.AL EXPENDITURES, SELEGTED COUNTI]):S IN 
VIRGINIA AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1962 
Variable 
x1; Dependent School District 
x2; Assessed Property Value 
per Student 
Number of Own~r-
Occupied Residences 
Number of Registered 
Voters 
x4; Median Family Income 
X8; Per Student State and 
Federal Aid to Education 
Regression 
Coefficient 
27.1868 
0.0079 
-0.1620 
0.0110 
-0.5596 
Multiple R2 = 0.6496; F = 38.0940** 
*Significant at the .05 level • 
. **Significant at the .• 01 level. 
Standard 
Et;"ror· 
8.2704 
0.0015 
0.1988 
0.0039 
0.2511 
t 
Value 
3.2872** 
5.2749** 
0.8150 
2.7767** 
2.2280* 
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